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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
—oooOooo— 
ROBERT D. COLLINS, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
vs. 
Case Nos. 970707-CA 
964300201 
Priority No. 15 PATRICIA M. COLLINS, 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant. 
—oooOooo— 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-
3(2)(h). Rothe v. Rothe. 787 P.2d 534, 535 (Utah App. 1990), "[i]n an appeal of a 
domestic case, we assume that the trial court's findings of fact are correct, and reverse 
only if they are clearly erroneous." (Citing Elmer v. Elmer. 776 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah 
1989); Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896, 899 
(Utah 1989) ("the same standard of review applies 'whether case is characterized as one 
in equity or one in law'")). 
1 
Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee ("husband") timely filed his notice of appeal 
regarding the distribution of property and debt associated with said property. 
Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant ("wife") filed a notice of cross-appeal regarding 
payment of child support and award of attorney's fees to husband. Pursuant to 
subsequent Agreement of the parties, the parties resolved their dispute regarding 
husband's appeal and the matter was subsequently dismissed. Wife's cross-appeal 
remains for decision by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. THE STIPULATION OF THE CROSS-APPELLANT 
FOR ENTRY OF DECREE OF DIVORCE WAS FREELY 
AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED ON THE RECORD. 
WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF CROSS-APPELLANT'S 
ATTORNEY 
Standard of Review: When parties enter into stipulation for entry of Decree of 
Divorce, the Court of Appeals in reviewing the parties' stipulation must review the 
parties' stipulation to determine whether the agreement meets the requirements for valid 
binding agreement. The Court must decide whether the parties' agreement was a putative 
stipulation or whether the agreement contained mutual assent of the parties for a 
valid binding agreement. Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah App. 1987). (See 
Record at p. 34, T.T.). 
II. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE APPELLANT 
WAS PROPER UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
2 
Standard of Review: In reviewing an award of attorney fees, the trial court is 
given broad discretion whether or not to award attorney fees. In determining the 
reasonableness of the amount of requested attorney's fees, there must be some evidence 
"'regarding the necessity of the number of hours dedicated, the reasonableness of the 
rate charged in light of the difficulty of the case and the request accomplished, and the 
rates commonly charged for divorce actions in the community.'" Talley v. Talley, 739 
P.2d 83,84 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); fKerr v. Kerr. 610 P.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980); 
Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). Utah Code Ann. §30-3-
3(2) provides, "[i]n any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, child support, 
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and 
attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or 
defense." 
In an appeal of a domestic case, "the Findings of Fact will be assumed to be 
correct, and will be reversed only if they are clearly erroneous" Rothe v. Rothe. 787 
P.2d 534, 535 (Utah App. 1990). (See wife's Objection to Proposed Decree and 
Findings\ husband's Response to Respondent's Objection to Proposed Findings and 
Decree and Petitioner's [husband's] Request for Attorney's Fees; Letter of the 
Honorable John A. Rokich, dated September 8, 1997; and interlineated Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law received by Judge Rokich, as an enclosure to the Judge's 
letter of April 8, 1997 and attached hereto as Exhibit "B" to the Addenda). 
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III. CROSS-APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ARE NOT SUPPORTED 
BY THE RECORD 
Standard of Review: Issues on appeal must be preserved at the trial level or 
there must be specific statement of grounds for seeking review of issue not preserved in 
Trial Court. See LMV Leasing. Inc. v. Conlin, et. aL 805 P.2d 189 (Utah App. 1991), 
where the Utah Court of Appeals, in determining Plaintiffs Award of Damages by 
Affidavits and Memoranda, the Court held that they would not reach the merits of the 
Defendant, [Conlin's] arguments because it [Conlin's Objection to the Award of 
Damages to Plaintiff] "was not adequately preserved for appeal by a timely objection 
during the trial proceedings. 'It is axiomatic that matters not presented to the Trial Court 
may not be raised for the first time on appeal.'" Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. Co., 
659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983); See also Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. James Constructors. 
Inc.. 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah App. 1988). See also, State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 75-80 
(Utah App. 1990) (limited exceptions to the general rule include exceptional 
circumstances, plain error, and deprivation of liberty interests); Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, 
Inc.. 787 P.2d. 525 (Utah App. 1990) and Hill v. Cloward. 377 P.2d 186, 188 (1962)). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The determinative case law in this matter includes Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 
(Utah App. 1987), which sets forth the requirements for a binding agreement; Utah Code 
Ann. §30-3-3(2) sets forth the discretion of the Trial Court to award costs and attorney 
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fees upon a determination that a party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense; 
and Utah Rules of Ci\ v R-.k- ^2(a) recognizes the authority of the Trial Court to enter 
an order and findings, in this case, a Decree of Divorce and I l i idii lgs of I '"'act ai id 
Coi icl/i isioi i of I a/v - , , • :onsistei it v'itl: i the tei i i: is ai id pi ovisions of the parties' stipulation 
read on the record or produced in writing and executed by the parties. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
T h e p i i t l i e s in (In1, i i i . i l ln i t p j i e j i ' a i b e l o r e Mir I i n i i o n i H r In lm A IsVl- a li in III1 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Tooele County, State of Utah for the trial 
scheduled regarding the adjudication of Plaintiff s/Appellant's ("husband's") Complaint 
for Divorce and Defendant's/Appellee's/Cross-Appellant's ("wife's") Counterclaim At 
t h e t i m e se t . ;-..; . •:
 v\ • .;* 
ti • ' • ^gotiations, the majority oi 
discussion occurred between the parties with their respective counsels. With the advice 
and assistance of their respective counsels, the parties reached an Agreement resolving all 
issues before UR. I ;,.-.. . "ourt and the parties' Agreement was oi ally ei ite it: eel :)! 1 till: :ic tit ial 
. , - u n c i i , 1997. 
The parties Stipulated Agreement was entered by the parties freely, knowingly 
and with the assistance of the parties' respective counsel. The Trial Court required oral 
testimony of each of the parties that they had "heard the Stipulation and agreed to all 
Ilit* terms mill n iiiiiiililiinHi!11' if'lhr Slipnl.ilinii ,11ini Mm liolli i nm unvd llhi.il! ..i I Iri'iTi; nf 
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Divorce could be entered pursuant to the terms and provisions of the Stipulation heard 
and entered by the Court." (Record p.34. T.T.). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 11, 1997, the parties appeared before the Honorable John A. Rokich for 
the adjudication of the husband's Complaint for Divorce and the wife's Counterclaim. 
The parties entered into negotiations with their respective counsels for a period of 
approximately five (5) hours. During the parties' negotiations, the parties would 
periodically request suggestion and preliminary recommendation from the Trial Court, off 
the record, in Judge Rokich's chambers, whereby, Judge Rokich attempted to 
assist the parties and their respective counsels regarding the disputed issues or 
question(s) brought to the judge.1 
During the parties' negotiations, the parties entered into full and complete 
settlement regarding the divorce issues which were entered on the trial record, by the 
parties, with the assistance of the respective parties' counsels. The stipulation for entry 
of decree of divorce was entered on two (2) separate occasions with the Trial Court. 
The first stipulated agreement of the parties, orally entered on the record in the early 
afternoon of June 11, 1997, addressed the husband's payment of alimony to the wife 
and the receipt of wife's dependent child disability income in lieu of husband's child 
support obligation. The second stipulated agreement of the parties, orally entered on 
1
 Discussions in chambers with the Judge were videotaped. 
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the record in the late afternoon of June 11, 1997, addressed issues concerning the 
distribution of real property between the parties, the payment of the liabilities on said 
properties and the payment of the marital debts. 
Pursuant to the parties' stipulated agreement for entry of Decree of Divorce, 
entcv -
or about June 24, 1997, proposed Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law for the review and approval to form by wife's attorney. 
On or about July 2, 1997, Petitioner received wife's Objection to Proposed Findings 
and Decree which requested substantial modification of the Decree and Findings as 
pi'oposi (1 h\ I 111J MI lul  i iillriiiity. 
On or about August 22, 1997, husband filed Petitioner ys Response to 
Respondent's Objection to Proposed Findings and Decree and Petitioner's Request for 
Attorney 'sfees, along with Affidavit of Wendy J. Lemsfor Attorney fs F\ >es, alleging that 
wife's Objection to Proposed Findings and Decree, were for the most part, frivolous and 
n 
entered by the parties, by and through counsel, on June 11, 1997. In husband's Objection 
and Request for Attorney Fees, husband requested an award of attorney's fees in the sum 
of $880.33 for having to defend against Respondent's Objection to Proposed Decree and 
Findings, which was supported by Affidavit of husband's attorney regarding attorney's 
fees 
On or about September 9, 1997, husband received the Trial Court's letter dated 
September 8, 199 7 by the Honorable John A. Rokich which required husband's counsel 
7 
to modify the Decree and Findings in accordance with the Court's interlineations. No 
request for hearing regarding the wife's Objection was requested by wife or her 
counsel. Therefore, the Court's interlineations were made without the benefit of a 
hearing on the issue. 
Counsel for the husband modified the Decree and Findings in accordance with 
the Court's letter and interlineations, and upon no ruling by the Trial Court regarding 
husband's request for attorney's fees regarding wife's Objection to Proposed Decree 
and Findings, husband's counsel submitted the modified Decree and Findings with a 
paragraph addressing husband's pending Request for Attorney's Fees, to wife's counsel 
and the Court. (See Decree of Divorce, p.8,^ f 26). The Honorable John A. Rokich signed 
the submitted Decree and Findings on or about October 29, 1997, which awarded $400.00 
to Respondent for defending against wife's Objection to Proposed Decree and Findings. 
On or about November 14, 1997, husband filed his Notice of Appeal regarding 
the Court's interlineation which required husband to pay one-half (1/2) of the marital 
home's second mortgage;2 and the Trial Court's denial of the full amount of attorney's 
fees requested by the husband. In response, wife filed her Notice of Cross-Appeal on 
or about November 26, 1997 addressing the award of the $400 attorney's fees to the 
2
 Pursuant to the parties' stipulation entered orally on the record, June 11, 1997, 
wife was awarded the marital home "subject to any and all liability thereon." The 
question raised on husband's appeal addressed whether the parties' subsequent 
agreement, also entered orally on the record, June 11, 1997, regarding the parties' 
agreement to pay one-half (1/2) each of any marital debts, included the second 
mortgage on the marital home. 
8 
husband and the agreement of the parties to accept wife's dependent child disability 
payment in lieu of husband's child support obligation. 
1 iftniii iiiiiiihil jiprvenienf h\ (he parties, the parties were able to come to an 
agreement regarding the husband's appeal issues and pursuant to Motion to Dismiss 
October 27 , 1998, b> the Utah Court of Appeals. 
•'*LHVLMAJt"I ill> ARGUMENT 
The parties, voluntarily, will ingly and with the assistance o f their respective 
counsels, entered into full and complete stipulation for entry o f Decree of Divorce at 
the time o f trial. Wife, with her counsel, made no recorded objection or otU-i >n 
ob j e c t i it :i g t c in ("(""' s i i fi n : c 1111 • in in I I n •. 1111 s 111111 v 1111 s b . 11111 i 111111 i m 111> i111 n b I in»; t • 
dependent disability income wife was receiving directly for the benefit o f the parties' 
minor child. Even when wife filed an objection to husband's proposed Decree o f 
Divorce and Findings o f Fact and Conclusion o f Law, wife failed to make any 
o b j e U i i m in iiiilllii i iiini limn mi) i i " d i d i i i j ' III I n l i l i i i | i | i n i i in i n . 
The Trial Court did not deny child support to the wife, as and for the minor 
child. The wife, pursuant to stipulation, with her attorney, voluntarily agreed on the 
record, to substitute husband's child support obligation with wi fe ' s dependent child 
receh iiig si ich payment I he wife was not coerced into this agreement by the Trial 
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Court, nor by the husband or husband's attorney. No where in the Trial Court's record 
does the wife or the wife's attorney, object to the substitution of husband's child 
support obligation. Wife's citation to in-chambers negotiations between the parties in 
her cross-appeal is not properly before this Appellate Court, as all such references are 
not preserved by trial record for purpose of review. 
Notwithstanding, wife's citations to negotiations between the parties and their 
respective counsels, wife's attempts to support her after-the-fact claims is an attempt to 
withdraw her stipulation, by claiming she was coerced by the Trial Court in accepting 
the child support substitution and that she was coerced by the Trial Court in entering 
her stipulation on the record at the time of the trial in this matter. Wife was not 
coerced in any manner. Wife had ample opportunity to try any issue before the Trial 
Court that she may have had disagreement thereon. Wife, however, failed to request 
oral argument regarding the issue of the substitution of her dependent child disability 
income for husband's child support obligation at the Trial level, and wife entered a 
stipulation accepting the substitution. Wife has such, failed to preserve that issue for 
decision at the Appellate level. 
The award of attorney fees to husband was proper under the circumstances as 
husband substantially prevailed over the issues disputed by wife in wife's Objection to 
Proposed Decree and Findings whereby wife disputed issues concerning: (1) party 
name designations, "Petitioner" rather than Plaintiff, for instance; (2) whether the 
10 
parties agreement that wife would be awarded three of the four real properties, 
including the marital home, subject to any and all liability thereon, including the 
marital home's second mortgage; (3) moot issues regarding the exchange of personal 
property; and other modifications, additions or substitutions to the parties' agreement 
which were not contemplated or agreed-upon by the parties at the time of entry of their 
stipulation for Decree of Divorce.3 (See wife's Objection to Proposed Findings and 
Decree', See husband's Petitioner's Response to Respondent's Objection to Proposed 
Findings and Decree and Petitioner's Request for Attorney's Fees; See letter of Court 
[Honorable John A. Rokich] dated September 8, 1997; and Interlineated Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (attached hereto in Addenda as Exhibit "B"). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STIPULATION OF THE CROSS-APPELLANT 
FOR ENTRY OF DECREE OF DIVORCE WAS FREELY 
AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED ON THE RECORD. 
WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF CROSS-APPELLANT'S 
ATTORNEY 
Cross-Appellant ("wife") voluntarily, knowingly and with the assistance of 
counsel, entered her stipulation orally on the record on June 11, 1997, after at least five 
(5) hours of negotiations between the parties and their respective counsels, regarding 
3
 It is particular to note, that at the time of wife's Objection to Proposed Order 
(Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law), wife failed to 
object to the substitution of her child dependent disability income for husband's child 
support obligation. Rather, wife raises that issue for the first time on appeal. 
11 
the substitution of wife's dependent child disability income in lieu of Appellant's 
("husband's") child support obligation during any period of time in which wife received 
dependent child disability income. The wife entered her stipulation regarding the 
agreement of child support substitution during the first stipulation of the parties entered 
on June 11, 1997 during the first part of afternoon). 
A subsequent entry of remaining issue concerning real property and payment of 
marital debts (second stipulation) was entered by the parties at the second part or late 
afternoon hours of June 11, 1997. At no time during the first entered stipulation, 
during the second entered stipulation, or during any time between the two stipulations, 
did wife give any indication that she did not understand the child support substitution 
agreement or that she had not given her consent to that agreement, voluntarily, 
willingly and without coercion. 
Moreover, even when wife subsequently objected {Objection to Proposed Decree 
and Findings, dated July 2, 1997), to the proposed Decree and Findings, submitted by 
husband's counsel, wife failed to mention or argue the child support substitution issue 
which she now for the first time raises on appeal. Wife has now changed her mind 
regarding her voluntary, knowing and assisted by counsel, stipulation and wife now 
wants to be allowed to change her mind regarding the child support substitution issue 
without any proper reason, justification or exception cited therefor. 
12 
A. Cross-Appellant's Stipulated Agreement for Waiver of 
Child Support was Properly Entered and Mirrored the 
Intent of the Parties 
Cross-Appellant's ("wife's") stipulated agreement for waiver of husband's child 
support obligation during any period of time in which wife was receiving social security 
dependent disability payments on behalf of the minor child, was properly entered 
before the Trial Court; was properly accepted by the Trial Court; and mirrored the 
intent of the parties to substitute husband's child support obligation with the additional 
moneys wife was receiving on behalf of the minor child due to wife's receipt of 
dependent child disability income. Utah statute and case law addresses the issue of 
substitution of an obligor's child support obligation during any period in which obligor 
is receiving dependent child disability income. See Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(8)(b); 
Brooks v. Brooks. 881 P.2d 955, 962 (Utah App. 1994), holding upon first impression, 
that a "trial court may, in its discretion, consider a child's receipt of social security 
disability benefits and allow a disabled parent credit for those benefits against the 
parent's child support obligation"; and Coulon v. Coulon. 915 P.2d 1069 (Utah App. 
1996), allowing offset of obligor's child support payments and receipt of social security 
disability payments on behalf of the minor child, but not arrearages. 
Thus, both Utah statutory and case law address the issue of offset or waiver of 
an obligor's child support obligation and receipt of social security dependent disability 
benefits. However, there is no case law addressing whether an obligee's receipt of 
13 
dependent disability income can substitute for an obligor's child support obligation. 
Notwithstanding the lack of statutory and case law on this issue, what is before the 
Court is the issue regarding whether wife's stipulation regarding the substitution of 
disability income for husband's (obligor's) child support obligation was proper and 
whether that issue is properly before this Court. 
The intent of the parties in this matter is clear. At the time of trial in this 
matter, June 11, 1997, the parties intended to enter into a full and complete stipulation 
for entry of Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. At the 
time of the parties' stipulation, they were both acting voluntarily, willingly, 
competently, and with the assistance of their respective counsels. The parties orally 
entered their stipulation which included an agreement to have the wife's social security 
disability income substitute the husband's child support obligation as long as wife was 
receiving that additional income on behalf of the minor child. The Trial Court has the 
discretion to enter the stipulation of the parties for entry of Decree of Divorce. As 
Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah App. 1987) held, "[fjor a stipulation to be 
binding, agreement by the parties must be evidenced by a signed writing which would 
satisfy the Statute of Frauds, or the agreement must be stated in Court and on the 
record before a Judge." 
The Trial Court does not have to accept and approve the stipulation of the parties 
regarding spousal or child support. However, in this matter, the Honorable John A. 
14 
Rokich found that the parties were entering voluntarily, freely and with the assistance of 
their respective attorneys, a stipulation for entry of Decree of Divorce. That stipulation 
provided for the payment of spousal support to the wife by husband, and the stipulation 
allowed the substitution of wife's dependent child disability income for husband's child 
support obligation. "A divorce court is not duty bound to carry out the terms agreed upon 
by parties in stipulation as to amount that should be paid to wife in lieu of alimony and 
the amount to be paid as child support" Madsen v. Madsen. 276 P.2d 917,(1954). See 
also, Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975), where husband objected to the entry of a 
consent decree on the grounds that he did not know the terms of the decree when he 
agreed to it, and that he agreed to it under duress, it was within the discretion of the trial 
court to accept or reject the decree, since it was in a position to determine whether the 
husband had actually agreed to be bound. 
In the instant case, the Trial Court did not have to accept the agreement of the 
parties which substituted husband's child support obligation with wife's receipt of social 
security dependent disability income on behalf of the minor child. However, the Trial 
Court was in a posture to review the entire stipulated agreement of the parties; was able to 
discern the parties' intent thereby; and was able to determine the underlying fairness and 
appropriateness of the parties' agreement. As such, the Trial Court's Findings and Order 
should not be disturbed. "In essence, the law really only enforces the intent of the parties 
as to the fundamental agreement between them" Rothe v. Rothe. 787 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 
15 
App. 1990). See also, Brown v. Brown. 744 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah App. 1987) stating: 
Basic to a valid stipulation is a meeting of the minds of those involved. 
The parties must have completed their negotiations either in person or 
through their attorneys acting within the rules of agency. The agreement 
then is reduced to writing, signed and filed with the clerk or read into the 
record before the court. This procedure would indicate obvious assent to 
the provisions of the agreement so stipulated. 
As in Brown, the parties in the matter before the Appellate Court, agreed to the 
substitution of husband's child support obligation; the agreement was read into the record 
on June 11, 1997; and the agreement was memorialized in writing pursuant to entered 
Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated October 29, 1997. 
At no time during the stipulation (first or second stipulation entered on June 11, 1997), 
nor at any time in wife's objection to the proposed Decree and Findings, dated July 2, 
1997, did wife enter an objection to her stipulated agreement of June 11, 1997, allowing 
and agreeing to the substitution of husband's child support obligation. Thus, there is 
"obvious assent [of the wife] to the provisions of the agreement so stipulated." Brown at 
335. 
II. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE APPELLANT 
WAS PROPER UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
Under the circumstances of the wife's Objection to Proposed Decree and 
Findings, where wife filed a frivolous Objection which for the most part, addressed 
issues which were non-material, such as the recently changed party-name designations 
from Plaintiff to "Petitioner," for instance, and address issues that were moot, such as a 
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listing of the parties exchange of personal property where the parties had already 
exchanged such property, the Trial Court in its discretion, determined that wife's 
objection to the proposed Decree and Findings were in part, frivolous, and awarded 
husband $400 of the $880.33 requested by husband of his attorney's fees and costs for 
having to respond to wife's objection. 
The Trial Court has broad discretion in awarding attorney's fees and costs where 
a party has substantially prevailed on a claim or issue. Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2) 
provides, "[i]n any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, child support, 
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and 
attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or 
defense." 
Moreover, wife failed to preserve any type of appellant argument regarding the 
award of attorney's fees to the husband where wife failed to file a timely or other 
objection to the trial Court's award of the $400.00 attorney's fees to the husband in 
response to the wife's frivolous Objection to Proposed Decree of Divorce. At no point 
during the time in which the modified Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were resubmitted to the Court, pursuant to the Court's 
interlineations, along with Rule 4-504 Notice pursuant to the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration to the wife and wife's attorney, on or about October 27, 1997, did 
wife ever object to the award of husband's attorney's fees. 
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Furthermore, wife failed to object to the husband's request for attorney's fees as 
submitted in the husband's Response to Petitioner's Objection to Decree and Findings 
and Request for Attorney's Fees nor in the husband's Notice to Submit for Decision 
regarding Petitioner's Request for Attorney's Fees, submitted on or about September 
25, 1997, to wife's attorney and the Court. As the Utah Court of Appeals has held: 
'If something occurs which the party thinks is wrong or so prejudicial to 
him that he thereafter, cannot have a fair trial, he must make his objection 
promptly and seek redress by moving for a mistrial, or by having cautionary 
instructions given, if that is deemed adequate, or be held to waive whatever 
rights may have existed to do so.' 'Otherwise, it would be manifestly unjust to 
permit a party to sit silently by, believing that prejudicial error had been 
committed' and then i f he loses, come forward' claiming error. 
Onveabor v. Pro Roofing. Inc.. 787 P.2d 525, 527 (Utah App. 1990). See also, (Hill 
v. Cloward. 377 P.2d 186, 188 (1962)). 
III. CROSS-APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ARE NOT SUPPORTED 
OR PRESERVED BY THE RECORD 
Over ninety (90%) of Cross-Appellant's (wife's) brief addresses in chamber 
discussions and negotiations between the parties, their respective counsel and the 
Honorable John A. Rokich. Wife is referring to matters that were heard off the record 
and that are not part of the Trial Court's Record in this matter.4 As such, any and all 
such portions of wife's cross-appeal should be dismissed as wife fails to properly refer 
to the Trial Court's record. See Onveabor, Id. 
4
 In chambers discussion with Judge Rokich were videotaped by the Court. 
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Notwithstanding wife's failure to properly refer to the Trial Court's record, wife 
is for the first time on appeal, raising issues that wife failed to object to whatsoever at 
the trial level. Wife stipulated to the substitution of husband's child support obligation 
with wife's receipt of social security dependent disability income received on behalf of 
the minor child. Wife failed to make a proper objection at the time of the stipulation or 
even after the parties' stipulation when wife filed her objection to the proposed Decree 
and Findings. Moreover, wife had a full day trial scheduled on June 11, 1997 in which 
she could have had ample opportunity to request argument and determination by the 
Trial Court regarding husband's child support obligation. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has held, where the Court was unable to locate any 
reference in the Trial Court's record regarding the Defendant's issue raised on appeal 
regarding an award of damages to Plaintiff, the Court stated, "[a]s appellants, the 
Conlin's bear the burden of building a trial record adequate to preserve their arguments 
on appeal. See Franklin Finn v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 
1983) (citing Conlin, 805 P.2d 189 (Utah App. 1991)). As the Court recognized in 
LMV Leasing. Inc. v. Conlin. et.aL 805 P.2d 189 (Utah Appeal. 1991), "the Conlins 
have advanced no argument that any of the recognized exceptions to the general rule 
are present here. Consequently, we decline to reach the merits of the Conlin's 
argument." Conlin at 197. 
Furthermore, not only has wife failed to properly preserve the issue of the 
substitution of husband's child support issue properly for appellate review, wife has 
failed to properly preserve her objection to the award of $400.00 attorney's fees to the 
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husband as wife failed to file a proper or timely objection to husband's request for 
attorney's fees or to the Court's subsequent award of the attorney's fees to the husband, 
at the trial level. At no time after husband's request for attorney's fees, Notice to 
Submit for Decision regarding husband's request for attorney's fees or even after the 
Court awarded husband's attorney's fees pursuant to second modified proposed Decree 
of Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, did wife ever once raise an 
objection to the award of attorney's fees to the husband. Wife again, had ample 
opportunity to raise this issue at the trial level and now in an attempt to circumvent 
proper procedures, rules and case law, is attempting to raise this issue for the first time 
on appeal. As such, wife should be precluded from raising this issue for the first time 
on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, wife's stipulation accepting the substitution of her own dependent 
child disability payment in lieu of husband's child support obligation during any period 
of time in which wife is receiving such disability payment, is not erroneous. Wife 
entered the stipulation, freely, voluntarily, and with the advice and assistance of wife's 
counsel. Wife cannot now claim that she was coerced in agreeing to the stipulation 
which allowed substitution of husband's child support obligation just because wife has 
now decided she is unhappy with her own voluntary decision made in June 1997. The 
Trial Court did not commit reversible error by accepting wife's stipulation because wife 
entered that stipulation of her own accord, with the advice and assistance of her 
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counsel, after five (5) hours of negotiations between the parties and their respective 
counsels. Moreover, Wife failed to object, at the trial level, her agreement of child 
support substitution. Thus wife is precluded from raising this issue for the first time on 
appeal. 
Furthermore, wife attempts to put blame for her own voluntary stipulation on the 
Trial Court. Wife claims that she was coerced in making the stipulation and that she 
could not have argued the child support issue before the Trial Court. The wife is in 
error. At the time of the June 11, 1997 stipulation for entry of Decree of Divorce, the 
parties gathered before the Trial Court in anticipation of a full day trial regarding the 
merits of husband's complaint and wife's counterclaim. At issue by the parties, was 
the amount, if any, of husband's child support obligation. Wife had every opportunity 
to argue the child support issue before the Trial Court and voluntarily chose not to do 
so; wife also had ample opportunity to file or enter an objection regarding the child 
support substitution at any time during the June 11, 1997 trial, or thereafter, with the 
Trial Court; nor has the wife cited to any exceptions allowing her to appeal an issue 
which she agreed upon and failed to properly object to at the trial level. Wife is 
therefore, precluded from raising this issue for the first time on appeal. 
Lastly, the award of $400 attorney fees to the husband was proper under the 
circumstances. Husband properly submitted the proposed Decree of Divorce and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to wife's attorney for approval to form. 
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Upon receipt thereof, wife's attorney filed an Objection to the Proposed Decree and 
Findings, raising frivolous issues such as party-designation terminology and mute issues 
concerning exchange of property.5 The Trial Court ruled substantially in husband's 
favor regarding wife's objection, and awarded husband less than one-half (1/2) of his 
requested attorney fees for having to respond to wife's Objection. 
Husband, pursuant to notice and interlineated change and modification by the 
Court to the proposed modified Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, resubmitted 
the Decree and Findings to the Court for approval, requesting an award of attorney's 
fees along with a Notice to Submit regarding attorney's fees to both the Court and 
wife's counsel. Again, wife failed to file any objection to the Petitioner's 
Request for Attorney's Fees in defending against wife's Objection to Proposed Decree 
and Findings and failed to file any type of objection to the second modified proposed 
Decree and Findings providing for additional interlineation by the Court for attorney's 
fees if appropriate. Again, wife failed to preserve her objection to the award of 
attorney's fees properly at the trial level, and as such wife should be precluded from 
raising this issue for the first time on appeal. 
Therefore, the Trial Court did not commit reversible error by accepting the 
5
 Wife did address a primary issue previously contested by the parties (pursuant to 
husband's Notice of Appeal) regarding whether the award of the marital home to the 
wife, subject to any and all liability thereon, excluded the second mortgage; and 
whether the parties were required to pay one-half (1/2) each of the second mortgage 
pursuant to their agreement to pay one-half (1/2) each of any and all marital debts. 
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wife's stipulation regarding the dependent child substitution of child support in lieu of 
husband's child support obligation; and the award of $400 attorney's fees to the 
husband was proper under the circumstances. Thus, the Decree of Divorce and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law should be affirmed and Appellant (husband) 
should be awarded his reasonable attorney's fees and costs for having to defend against 
wife's cross-appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7 day of February, 1999. 
JL 
Wendy J. Lems, 
Attomev^or Petitioner/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed 
on the ^ £ a a y of February, 1999 to the following: 
D. Bruce Oliver 
D. BRUCE OLIVER, P.C. 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Trial Transcript of Parties' Stipulation entered June 11, 1997 
B. Letter dated September 8, 1997 by Judge Rokich, along with interlineated 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
C. Entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated October 27, 1997 





IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. COLLINS, : HEARING 
Petitioner/Appellant, : Case No. 9644300201 
Court of Appeals 
Us. : No. 970707-CA 
PATRICIA M. COLLINS, : Judge Lee Dever 
Respondent/Appellee. : 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 11th day of June, 
p.997, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing before 
the HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH, sitting as Judge in the above-
named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the 
following proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
SEED 
A S S O C I A T E D P R O F E S S I O N A L R E P O R T E R S , L C 
10WestBroad\\a\ Suite 200 Salt Lake Cit) Utah 84101 (801)322-3441 Fax (801) 322-3443 
2 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
F o r t h e P e t i t i o n e r / A p p e l l a n t : 
F o r t h e R e s p o n d e n t / A p p e l l e e : 
- 0 O 0 
I N D E X 
witnesses: Page 
Robert D. Collins 
Direct Examination by Ms. Lems 37 
Examination by the Court 38 
Patricia M. Collins 
Direct Examination by Ms. Oliver 3 8 
Mr. Jerome H. Mooney 
Ms. Wendy J. Lems 
MOONEY LAW FIRM 
50 West Broadway, 4th Fir. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Mr. D. Bruce Oliver 
Attorney at Law 
180 South 300 West, #210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Robert D. Collins versus Patricia M. 
3 i Collins, Case No. 9643 00201. Counsel, submit your appearance 
4 | for the record, please. 
5 | MS. LEMS: Wendy Lems on behalf of the plaintiff, 
6 I Robert Collins. 
7 MR. OLIVER: Bruce Oliver representing Patty 
8 Collins, the defendant, Your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Have you been able to resolve any of the 
10 issues and narrow the case down? 
11 MS. LEMS: I believe somewhat, if Bruce is agreeing 
12 to the stipulation that we made regarding the retirement and 
13 so forth (inaudible). Partial stipulation, Your Honor, I'll 
14 go ahead and read that into the record. "The defendant will 
15 be entitled to one half of any of the retirement amounts that 
16 were accrued during the parties marriage up to the date of 
17 their separation, which was January 3 of 1996." That will be 
18 done pursuant to a quadro. 
19 THE COURT: Or other such document as required by 
2 0 the retirement agency. 
21 MS. LEMS: No problem with that, Judge. The 
22 personal property, the defendant has agreed to return any and 
23 all personal property that belonged to the plaintifffs mother 
24 or the mother!s estate. Those properties consist of a 
25 rocking chair, a wash stand, some china, some silverware, a 
26 couch, some end tables and other odds and ends. I do not 
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1 believe that the parties are in dispute of what those items 
2 are. 
3 Any of the plaintiff's premarital property, any 
4 property that he brought in prior to the marriage, the 
5 defendant has agreed to return to him. If the defendant has 
6 the plaintiff's grandfather's pocket watch, she will return 
7 that to him. Also, any of the plaintiff's father's coins 
8 will be returned to the plaintiff, and any dishes, or odds 
9 and ends and pictures of the plaintiff's godfathers will be 
10 returned to the plaintiff. 
11 Also, evidently, there are three TV's still in the 
12 marital home. The defendant has agreed to provide one of the 
13 two TV's that are not working. She evidently has the other 
14 TV that is the only TV in the marital home that she alleges 
15 is working right now. So, one of the three TV's is going to 
16 Mr. Collins. 
17 Also, we have a dispute regarding chain saws. Have 
18 you agreed to anything on that? 
19 MS. COLLINS: (Inaudible). 
20 MS. LEMS: Evidently we have no stipulation 
21 regarding the return of the chain saws or the miter saw that 
22 is at issue here. So we will be arguing that. On any type 
23 of tools that Mr. Collins had, those will be returned to him. 
24 The camper and the motorcycle, are we arguing that? 
25 MR. OLIVER: Yes with the furniture division. 
26 MS. LEMS: Okay. And then there is also some home 
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1 | videos of the plaintiff and the minor child that will be 
2 I either provided to the plaintiff or copies of those will be 
3 provided to him. 
4 Then on the issue of the visitation, the defendant 
5 had requested supervised visitation. The parties have agreed 
6 that visitation will go unsupervised with the provision that 
7 if the plaintiff is assumed to be drinking 24-hours prior to 
8 visitation or during any type of visitation with the minor 
9 child that a police officer will be called. That police 
10 officer will verify if he has any type of alcohol in his 
11 system and if that's the case then visitation will 
12 automatically cease --
13 THE COURT: And give the blood test or breathalyser, 
14 does he wind up here in the jail, (inaudible)? 
15 MR. OLIVER: Well, I think certainly if there are 
16 other legal issues that are pertinent thereto --
17 THE COURT: That's what I am saying. If you call a 
18 police officer and he gives him a breathalyser (inaudible) 
19 vehicle he is going to wind up here. I just call that to his 
20 attention. 
21 MR. OLIVER: Yeah. I think that would be at the 
22 discretion of the police officer to determine whether or not 
23 that is a factor, Your Honor. 
24 MS. LEMS: And I think what needs to be pointed out 
25 is that it needs to be a realistic suspicion of drinking. It 
26 can't be just because the parties are mad at each other or 
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1 something to that effect. Thatfs the extent of the 
2 stipulation as I know it, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. What are going to be the issues 
4 here? The division of the real estate, is that the big 
5 issue? Alimony? 
6 MS. LEMS: Alimony and also the distribution of the 
7 debts, the marital debts and some of the personal property of 
8 the parties are at issue. 
9 THE COURT: And the division of the real estate? 
10 MS. LEMS: Yeah. 
11 THE COURT: But they still have, I think, about four 
12 units, rental units and so forth? 
13 MS. LEMS: Yes. Three rental units and a marital 
14 home. 
15 THE COURT: Three rentals and a marital home. And 
16 they have been married for, if I recall --
17 MR. OLIVER: Fifteen years, Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Fifteen years. 
19 MR. OLIVER: Maybe fourteen years. 
2 0 THE COURT: Now, you got married June 25, 1983? 
21 MR. COLLINS: That's correct. 
22 MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, just one addition to that 
23 stipulation and that was that in addition to the stipulation 
24 was that in the event that Mr. Collins does anything that 
25 would otherwise jeopardize the safety of the minor child, 
26 that sanctions on visitation could be imposed and then he 
would have to come back to Court. 
2 I THE COURT: Right. 
3 MR. OLIVER: So, not just the consumption of 
4 alcohol, but other issues. We want to make sure that the 
5 minor child is safe with him. 
6 MS. LEMS: And I think that it would be appropriate 
7 as well, Your Honor, if we can stipulate to neither party 
8 despairing one another in the presence of the minor child. 
9 THE COURT: Right. 
10 MS. LEMS: Any type of divorce proceedings and 
11 whatnot are not discussed in the presence of a minor child. 
12 MR. OLIVER: No objection to that, Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: So the child is now what, eight years 
14 old? 
15 MS. LEMS: Seven, Your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Seven. And is there an issue with 
17 regards to some contributions made to the acquisition of real 
18 property through inheritance? 
19 MS. LEMS: Yes, there is. 
20 THE COURT: And that was in the amount of $1,500 or 
21 something like that? 
22 MS. LEMS: We have listed $1,800 and the defendant 
23 has stated it about at a little over $1,300. So we are not 
24 too (inaudible). 
25 THE COURT: But, why can't we divide it? This has 
26 been a marriage that has been for fifteen years, and of 
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1 course we are going to wind up dividing everything equally --
2 MR. OLIVER: Your Honor --
3 THE COURT: -- except for if it can be shown that 
4 none of the others contributed assets that came from other 
5 than the marriage. 
6 MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, I think that we have 
7 attempted through negotiations to work something of that 
8 fashion out. One of the issues comes down to the disparity 
9 in earning capacity between the parties. My client is 
10 disabled and receiving SSI. 
11 THE COURT: Right. I know that. 
12 MR. OLIVER: And Mr. Collins works for the post 
13 office (inaudible). 
14 THE COURT: Well, he makes about $33,000 and she is 
15 getting seven hundred and something plus three hundred for 
16 the child. 
17 MR. OLIVER: That's correct. 
18 THE COURT: So there's a thousand dollars. 
19 MR. OLIVER: And so we have been trying to work it 
2 0 out, working in a formula that involves alimony one way or 
21 another. And we just have not been able to strike the 
22 formula that would say, "This will work," or "That won't 
23 work." So, we have gotten fairly close, but we just haven't 
24 been able to. 
25 THE COURT: Now, I probably should have had you come 
26 into chambers and we could discuss this and see if I can't 
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1 get these issues resolved. 
2 MR. OLIVER: We'll be happy to come back there. 
3 THE COURT: Why don't we do that. And I think it 
4 might be very helpful and meaningful if we do that. 
5 (Recess) 
6 (In Chambers) 
7 THE COURT: Plaintiff has proposed a division of the 
8 real estate in lieu of paying alimony. That's as I view 
9 this, is that correct? 
10 MS. LEMS: Yes, it is, Your Honor. And we were 
11 going to propose today that that would be an equitable 
12 distribution or taking one half and one half of the 
13 properties, splitting them in half. 
14 THE COURT: If we split the property in half. Now, 
15 what is your total income now? 
16 MS. COLLINS: $873 (inaudible). 
17 THE COURT: $873 plus --
18 MR. COLLINS: $1073. 
19 MS. COLLINS: Mine and my daughters. 
20 THE COURT: $1073, yeah. 
21 MR. COLLINS: Total. 
22 THE COURT: Total. Okay. His is? 
23 MS. LEMS: He is making $3,016 a month. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. If the Court divided the property 
25 equally and whether that can be done or not, I don't know. I 
26 mean, the rental units amount to about $800 a month 
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1 I supposedly clear made off the rentals, is that right or is 
2 | that just the gross profit? 
3 | MS. LEMS: That's not the net profit, no. 
4 | MR. OLIVER: Well --
THE COURT: That must be --
6 I MR. OLIVER: I think that's speculative as to 
7 exactly what the net profit would be. It depends on the 
8 repairs and so forth. 
9 THE COURT: I doubt very much (inaudible) payments. 
10 I donft know the value out here in Tooele like some other 
11 places I have been, but if I just divided the property equal, 
12 he is going to still pay some alimony. So, if you divided 
13 the property equally and he is making three and she is 
14 getting a thousand, he is going to have to pay a certain 
15 amount of alimony. 
16 MS. LEMS: We propose that if we do the half and 
17 half, that he would pay $300 a month in alimony for ten years 
18 at which time that matter could be readdressed without a 
19 petition to modify. 
2 0 MR. OLIVER: Our position on that, Your Honor, is 
21 that $3 00 with one half the property division is not 
22 sufficient to maintain my client. As*a matter of fact, from 
23 the rental income along with the alimony would not even make 
24 her house payment, which doesnft give her a lot to live on --
25 THE COURT: No, itfs not. 












her SSI and so forth. But she has had to borrow a 
substantial amount of money during the pendency of this 
action. 
THE COURT: I don't doubt that. What about the 
child, though? 
MR. OLIVER: There is another issue that I think we 
need to raise at this point in time and that is that we don't 
believe the Court is ultimately going to find the $3,016 as 
his final income. We believe that he has several side jobs 
that has brought him in since the first of this year --
THE COURT: What about the tax returns? What do the 















MR. OLIVER: I don't know that the tax returns show 
the part time jobs, Your Honor, but we have got people who 
will testify, and we've got canceled checks and so forth 
showing that he has received probably about $5,000 since the 
first of this year on side jobs, 
MS. LEMS: And thatf s not net, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: But it hasn't been reported on their 
income tax return? 
MS. LEMS: No. They haven't filed income tax 
returns for several years. Notwithstanding how intelligent 
this part time is, but they havenft filed it. 
THE COURT: Both of you are going to be liable for 
that. 
MS. LEMS: We also have on our end, testimony 
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1 through a deposition where she stated that her father is 
2 paying her anywhere from $600 to $700 a month, friends and 
3 family are providing at least a couple of thousand dollars a 
4 month to her. So, under the statute any gifts or any of that 
5 effect is considered income. 
6 MR. OLIVER: They are loans. 
7 THE COURT: Pardon? 
8 MR. OLIVER: They are loans. 
9 THE COURT: I don't believe that. I think the 
10 alimony, well, the alimony award, I don't see any way out of 
11 it. Divide the property and alimony at $300 a month may not 
12 be enough. What about the child? It is because of her she 
13 is getting the --
14 MR. OLIVER: That's correct. Stuff he has to sign. 
15 THE COURT: So he is alleviated that obligation 
16 evidently by getting the social security and paying for the 
17 child. So he has got to pay more than (inaudible). I will 
18 equalize it out. Her total income would be about equal to 
19 what he has got. And they both share the debts equally and 
20 divide the property up equally. 
21 MS. LEMS: So what is the Court's suggestion if we 
22 do divide it equally, how much alimony are we looking at? 
23 THE COURT: Well, it depends on -- if he has got --
24 if she has got a $1,073 now and what's his net after taxes, 
25 what is his taxes? 
26 MS. LEMS: He made for '96 $36,200. 
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1 THE COURT: No, I mean, his monthly, what is his 
2 monthly income after he pays his taxes and et cetera? $1,600? 
3 MS. LEMS: I'd have to look at it, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: It's about fifty percent of it. He 
5 gets $3,000 a month -- what's his take home, let's put it 
6 that way? 
7 MS. LEMS: I have his last pay stub, Your Honor, 
8 it's in my other exhibits. He has the health insurance 
9 coming off and the life insurance coming off and --
10 THE COURT: Well, what of his net (inaudible)? 
11 MS. LEMS: Well, we have also proposed how I have it 
12 in my trial brief as well giving an equitable distribution, 
13 giving him the one property and giving her the three 
14 remaining ones. 
15 THE COURT: I don't doubt that the property is 
16 substantial, but like I always said, unless she sells the 
17 property she is not going to realize a lot out of it because 
18 if her mortgage (inaudible) generally you are lucky to have 
19 the rental to cover the mortgage and all of the expense of 
20 keeping the property up. 
21 MS. LEMS: There is one --
22 THE COURT: That might be a burden on her to do 
23 that. 
24 MS. LEMS: There is one property that is paid in 
25 full other than it has about a $318 payment to be made and 
26 that one will be paid. 
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1 MR. OLIVER: And the problem with that piece of 
2 property is that itfs actually owned in thirds. 
3 THE COURT: Where are you looking at? 
4 MR. OLIVER: Well, it's not reflected. There is 
5 actually a third party that is part of that. 
6 THE COURT: Well, what is his take home? 
7 MR. OLIVER: It looks like from his financial 
8 declaration that I'm going off of, Your Honor, and I am going 
9 to be subtracting out of that, just to let the Court know, a 
10 savings plan that he puts $140 per month into and a credit 
11 union which is $310. I'm leaving the balance of the 
12 deductions in place. That takes off $450 off of $83 8 so that 
13 would come down to be about, if I'm not mistaken, about $388. 
14 MS. LEMS: Plus he pays $80 in health insurance. 
15 MR. OLIVER: So $2,374 plus $450 would be $2,824. 
16 It looks like that is his net income. 
17 THE COURT: Twenty-eight hundred? 
18 MR. OLIVER: Twenty-eight hundred. 
19 THE COURT: That would be a little high, wouldn't 
20 it? I mean, $3,000 a month --
21 MR. COLLINS: I would say based on three grand a 
22 month after you deduct the health and life insurance and the 
23 (inaudible). Two grand (inaudible). 
24 THE COURT: Yeah. 
25 MR. COLLINS: My take home --my checks -- like the 
26 last check I got was for $890. 
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1 I MS. LEMS: And I can pull those stubs if you would 
2 I like, Your Honor. 
3 MR. OLIVER: One of the problems that we have got 
4 though, is he is making payments on his personal vehicle and 
5 so forth out of this check. 
6 THE COURT: But I don't think -- you just said that 
7 he is making, grossing $3,016. He has got netting at $2,800. 
8 MR. OLIVER: Now, let me just tell you where we come 
9 from. This come off of his financial declarations that has 
10 been submitted to the Court. That's what I am relying on. I 
11 am not guessing anything. 
12 THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
13 MR. OLIVER: He also has included an extra $200 in 
14 this. It says, "All other sources specified contracting side 
15 work which is not consistent or dependable." And he put $200 
16 per month on that. So that takes it up to $3,212. I'm 
17 looking at their figures on this financial declaration. That 
18 takes it up to $3,212. Then he pulls out State and Federal 
19 Income Taxes of $150. Number of exemptions taken, 6. 
20 THE COURT: That won't cover his income tax. 
21 MS. LEMS: If I can pull his check stubs, then we 
22 can look right at those. 
23 THE COURT: Let's get the check stub and let's look 
24 at it. 
25 MR. OLIVER: I understand. But I am just going 











THE COURT: That's why I am bothered by that is that 
MS. LEMS: We have got a whole slew of them here, 
Your Honor, so we can look at whatever ones you want. Do you 
want me to grab the most recent one? 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MS. LEMS: Here's a pay period one, Your Honor, 6-
9 97. That's the most recent. Right? 
10 MR. COLLINS: Well, it's not. We're more than 
11 that. But that's certainly within the ballpark. 
12 MS. LEMS: I'll double check then, Your Honor, 
13 because I believe that's --
14 MR. COLLINS: That's four and a half hours, six and 
15 a half hours of overtime which is nonexistent at this point. 
16 MS. LEMS: That's the most recent one I have, Your 
17 Honor. 
18 THE COURT: So that's $2,804. That's what he is 
19 taking home. 
2 0 MS. LEMS: That's on the income, that's on the 
21 overtime and the testimony will show and we have also got 
22 verification from the postal service that they have done 
23 cutbacks through the U.S. Postal Service and that overtime is 
24 no longer available. 
25 THE COURT: So how much overtime is involved in this 
26 check? 
1 
1 MR. ROLLINS: Well, the "o" here signifies -- they 
2 do it in hundreds. So there is 9800 hundreds, that's two 
3 hours and there is a four and a half, so six and a half hours 
4 of overtime on that check, which comes to a hundred --
5 THE COURT: One hundred and ninety-six. So you take 
6 it down and that brings you down to $2,600. $2,600 and she 
7 has got $1,073. I think (inaudible) $2,500. 
8 MR. COLLINS: So, $1,150. 
9 THE COURT: So the alimony (inaudible) at $600. 
10 MS. LEMS: Is that in addition to the child support? 
11 THE COURT: Shefs not paying any child support 
12 because -- she only gave me -- how much are you getting in 
13 child support, $1,073; right? 
14 MS. COLLINS: That's my social security money. 
15 That's not child support. 
16 THE COURT: I thought I saw in here that you were 
17 getting so much per month for a child? 
18 MS. COLLINS: $386 because I am disabled. 
19 THE COURT: So you are getting this $386 for child 
2 0 and --
21 MS. COLLINS: I get $1,073 total. 
22 THE COURT: That's what I said, $1,073. So, if he 
23 pays about $600 that makes you about equal, the two of you. 
24 And so, how do you want to break it down as to that child 
25 support or alimony, I don't know. (Inaudible) the child is 
26 getting that income. 
18 
1 I MS. LEMS: So, are you suggesting, Your Honor, just 
2 | to make sure that I am clear, that we would divide the 
3 J properties in half and that he would pay $600 a month then in 
4 alimony? 
5 THE COURT: Right. 
6 MS. LEMS: And there would be no other additional 
7 sums owing on child support --
8 THE COURT: No. 
9 MS. LEMS: -- since she does get dependent 
10 disability income for the child. 
11 THE COURT: Right. Right. 
12 MR. OLIVER: Now, just for my information 
13 clarification, the $600 is that a round figure or are we 
14 going to ultimately divide it in half? 
15 THE COURT: Well, I think that's close enough. I am 
16 going to leave it at that. 
17 MR. OLIVER: The reason I say that is because I 
18 think it comes out closer to $750 if we take -- and you round 
19 it down to $2,500. 
20 THE COURT: Right. And, yeah, Ifm going to give him' 
21 the benefit of the doubt, $2,500. And I think if he pays --
22 MR. OLIVER: And I think that her income, rather 
23 than $1,073, because that actually includes child support as 
24 we have defined it. 
25 THE COURT: Sure. Right. 
26 MR. OLIVER: But even taking it at $1,073, that 
19 
1 | would still come out to be $600. 
2 I THE COURT: She would be making -- she would be 
3 getting $1,673 a month. 
4 MR. OLIVER: And he would be getting $1,900 and 
5 something. 
6 THE COURT: No. He wouldn't be getting that much. 
7 MR. OLIVER: Yeah. If you took $600 off $2,500 he 
8 would be getting $1,900. 
9 THE COURT: Letfs see. About $1,900. 
10 MR. OLIVER: So, if we are going to split it, then 
11 it would be about another $150 difference. Thatfs why I 
12 asked the question. 
13 THE COURT: Just divide everything equally. The 
14 only thing I can do is divide it all equally. She pays --
15 well, get to that now. She'll pay her fees and he'll pay his 
16 fees and if we are going to divide it up equal, they are 
17 going to pay all the debts, split the debts, each pay their 
18 own fees and costs. 
19 MS. LEMS: There is an issue on debts, Your Honor, 
2 0 in the sense that we can show from all the ZCMI and other 
21 credit charges, and so forth, that after the parties 
22 separation --
23 THE COURT: Anything after the separation she has to 
24 pay. 
25 MR. LEMS: It should be their own separate debts. 
26 THE COURT: Yeah, each pay their own. 
20 
1 I MR. OLIVER: We have no problem with that. 
2 I THE COURT: Pardon? 
3 MR. OLIVER: We have no problem with debts acquired 
4 after the separation. 
5 THE COURT: Yeah. Pay that and then each pay your 
6 own fees and you are going to split this (inaudible) 
7 substantial equity in the houses, if you have to sell the 
8 house, you have to sell the house. 
9 MS. LEMS: Then, what are we looking on if we are 
10 going to take the properties in half, we were wanting the 98 
11 North Fort; is that correct, along with the 280 West one? 
12 THE COURT: You decide which property --
13 MR. COLLINS: I think they would prefer that I took 
14 the 118 because Tina is involved in that one. 
15 MS. LEMS: Do you feel comfortable with that? 
16 THE COURT: So if you did it that way, that's about 
17 the only way we can do it. 
18 MS. LEMS: And $600 in alimony to her for what 
19 period of time are we looking at? 
20 THE COURT: Well, it's permanent. 
21 MR. OLIVER: Again, I want a clarification. Are you 
22 saying $600 or are you saying split? So they --
23 THE COURT: Just divide it equally. Just divide 
24 everything equally, right down the center. 
25 MR. OLIVER: So we take it and we add up both 
26 incomes and split it in half and each is going to get half of 
21 
that? 
2 THE COURT: Yeah. Half of the property and each pay 
3 their own fees and costs. Well, I am just giving a rough 
4 figure. I mean, you have got the calculators. You can 
5 figure it out. 
6 MR. COLLINS: Am I allowed to speak here? 
7 THE COURT: Sure. 
8 MR. COLLINS: That is my annual salary. 
9 THE COURT: Yeah. 
10 MR. COLLINS: Okay. So we have taken her monthly 
11 salary is $1,073. 
12 THE COURT: Take the annual. Just figure it by 
13 annual. 
14 MR. COLLINS: So we divide this by twelve again. I 
15 am making $3,600 a month and I am making a lot of payments on 
16 health insurance and this sort of thing. 
17 THE COURT: Well, she has got to pay half the health 
18 insurance. 
19 MR. COLLINS: Well, my health insurance is heavily 
2 0 subsidized through the --
21 THE COURT: I know. But whatever it is she has got 
22 to pay half. 
23 MS. LEMS: I don't know if his plan administrator 
24 will allow her to stay on the health insurance when --
25 THE COURT: She won't, but the child can. She can't 
26 stay so you take her off. 
22 
1 I MR. COLLINS: Well, I have no objection to paying. 
2 I I think itfs only like $18 a pay period to keep my child on 
3 I it and I don't have an objection to paying that. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. That's nine dollars a month. 
5 MR. OLIVER: But he's not paying any child support. 
6 THE COURT: Yeah. 
7 MR. OLIVER: So, I think that that should just be 
8 awash at minimum. I mean, he is not paying anything in child 
9 support. He is getting benefits --
10 MS. LEMS: Well, he has committed to pay the nine 
11 dollars that it is going to cost to keep the child on there. 
12 That's not a problem. 
13 THE COURT: Yeah. So why don't you get your 
14 calculators out and figure it out and you need to take the 
15 property, and if you can't arrive -- put it this way: if you 
16 can't arrive at a division of the property, I'll just order 
17 that it be sold and divide the cash. Because according to 
18 the Memorandum there is substantial equities in those 
19 properties and if you are going to sell them, this is the 
20 time to sell. 
21 MS. COLLINS: Are we talking just the rentals or we 
22 talking the home, my daughters home, too? 
23 THE COURT: Everything. Everything. Sell 
24 everything. Each has first chance to buy it, first option of 
25 purchasing. So you can just divide it and sell it or come to 
26 an agreement of who takes what. 
2 
1 MR. OLIVER: Would it be possible to have the 
2 alimony set up on a direct deposit from the employer? 
3 THE COURT: No. He can just pay it. 
4 MR. COLLINS: I think I should have the option of 
5 in good faith making those payments and if I --
6 THE COURT: If you don't, then we'll get direct --
7 If you want to on that alimony, if you want to take part of 
8 it child support or you want to take it in alimony, that's up 
9 to you to decide. But I think in the calculation for the 
10 child support, you have to take into account that $289. I 
11 don't have a chart informing me how much he would be entitled 
12 to, but that's (inaudible) or take your income and his income 
13 and figure it out. So, however you want to work it. 
14 MS. LEMS: But at this point if we take the 
15 differences in their income and divide it in half as the 
16 Court suggested, you are looking at $713.50. 
17 MR. OLIVER: With an equal distribution of the 
18 property. 
19 THE COURT: Right, it's got to be equal. Everything 
20 has to be equal. 
21 MR. OLIVER: Well, now, I am actually willing to 
22 take -- are we operating under the assumption that if we take 
23 the presumed value of the property, since we haven't had 
24 these appraised, if we can agree on the value of the property 
25 and we say, "Okay. It's worth $50,000 and we owe $20,000, 
26 the net worth of that property is $30,000? 
24 
1 THE COURT: Whatever you two work out on the 
2 division of properties is fine with me. 
3 MS. LEMS: We have already worked that out, Your 
4 Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Then, if you are agreeable to that, then 
6 that's fine. But that doesn't -- I mean, if one gets too, 
7 you have in mind offsetting the value of the property versus 
8 alimony. 
9 MS. COLLINS: I will take the property and no 
10 alimony. 
11 MR. OLIVER: Okay. Let's go outside and talk. 
12 THE COURT: I just want to save you the time and 
13 expense (inaudible). If you read all of the Utah cases, 
14 that's about all a judge can do in a fifteen year marriage. 
15 MS. LEMS: Well, I think it's fairly reasonable that 
16 we do it that way and that's what the case law says. 
17 MR. OLIVER: The other thing that I think we might 
18 be able to resolve here is an issue with regards to some 
19 personal property. I don't think there is a lot of dispute. 
2 0 There was a couch and a chair and an ottoman purchased from 
21 R.C. Willey's by the parties. What Mr. Collins says is that 
22 he wants either the couch or the chair and the ottoman. My 
23 client wants all three pieces of property based upon the fact 
24 that Mr. Collins also wants the camper and he has the 
25 motorcycle that was purchased during the marriage and we 
26 don't have a problem with him taking the camper and the 
1 I motorcycle. We would like the furniture in exchange. I 
2 I think that's really about the only property issue that we are 
3 talking about. There is other things that are involved and 
4 he is also getting all of his tools which has a substantial 
5 value to offset other things, but I think that's the only 
6 property issue we are talking about. 
7 MS. LEMS: And, Your Honor, the reason that we 
8 suggested that we split whatever the parties purchased 
9 together at R.C. Willey, is we are not requesting any type of 
10 interest in the Ford Bronco that she has purchased with funds 
11 from the second mortgage. 
12 THE COURT: Why don't you take the furniture and 
13 divide that up, too. He gets part of that and she gets part 
14 of it. 
15 MS. LEMS: We are not asking for any other 
16 furniture. 
17 THE COURT: Well, that's no problem. He can take --
18 MS. LEMS: Whatever works for Mr. Oliver and his 
19 client, we'll be willing to take the chair or the couch. 
20 MR. OLIVER: We'll take the camper. 
21 MS. LEMS: We can sell the camper. The camper is 
22 worth about $500, you know. 
23 MR. OLIVER: Why don't we just sell the camper and 
24 split the proceeds. That would make a simple solution to that 
2 5 one. 






MS. LEMS: Well, if we get into that, we'll end up 
in 
MR. COLLINS: We're back to square one. I purchased 
the motorcycle --
5 I THE COURT: Let me tell you what I think. One 
6 thing. Now, you can be here and you go to trial, you will 
7 spend more money on attorney's fees than what you are 
8 fighting about. So be reasonable. In order to get these 
9 things resolved, you have to be reasonable. It's not a life 
10 I and death matter. You know, I don't know why people -- what 
11 price you put on peace of mind. Is it worth fighting one 
12 another over a piece of furniture or over a $500 camper? Is 
13 it worth it? 
14 Like I have seen here, I just had a case here not 
15 too long ago, the people wound up owing the attorneys more 
16 than their estate was worth. So, if you want to do that, 
17 fine. I can take the bench and (inaudible). My hands are 
18 pretty well tied. I have some discretion, but I am going to 
19 divide everything equally, but, gees, if you are going to be 
20 fighting about a camper or some furniture, then (inaudible) 
21 pretty well assured of getting your alimony regularly, unless 
22 they fire him, that's highly unlikely as a postal worker, so 
23 look at the pluses. I have so many come in that are awarded 
24 alimony that never get paid. So, just have a little give and 
25 take and I think you can get this worked out. 
26 MS. LEMS: I agree, Your Honor. 
1 I MR. OLIVER: If you can give us just a few minutes, 
2 I I think we can work it out. 
3 THE COURT: Sure. All afternoon I am here. Thank 
4 you. 
5 MS. LEMS: Thank you. 
6 (Recess) 
7 THE COURT: This is the matter of Robert D. Collins 
8 versus Patricia Collins. Case No. 964300201. Let the record 
9 indicate that the plaintiff is present represented by Ms. 
10 Lems and the defense present represented by Mr. Oliver. And 
11 it's my understanding a stipulation has been reached in this 
12 case? 
13 MS. LEMS: I'm sorry, Your Honor. 
14 MR. OLIVER: Yes, Your Honor, we do have a 
15 stipulation. And I'll let Ms. Lems recite. 
16 THE COURT: If you will step up here to the lectern 
17 so that it will be picked up on the machine here? 
18 MS. LEMS: Sure, Your Honor. The parties have 
19 agreed that the plaintiff will be awarded the property 
20 located at 280 West Vine and that the remaining properties 
21 including the marital home will be awarded to the defendant. 
22 Both of the parties will assume any and all liability on 
23 those properties holding the other harmless thereon. 
24 The parties have agreed that the plaintiff will pay 
25 the defendant $300 a month in alimony for a period of ten 
26 years. At that time the alimony will terminate unless the 
28 
1 defendant brings some sort of motion, she doesn't have to 
2 bring a Petition to Modify to have that revisited. 
3 The amount that the defendant is receiving for the 
4 minor child on the disability income will substitute as any 
5 type of child support. Therefore, there will be no order of 
6 child support that the plaintiff has to pay the defendant. 
7 The parties will take one half each of the marital 
8 debts. Those are any debts that were incurred during the 
9 parties marriage up until the date of the parties separation 
10 which was January 3rd of 1996. 
11 The personal property of the parties, the plaintiff 
12 will be awarded the camper free and clear from any interest I 
13 that the defendant may have in that. In exchange for that, 
14 the defendant will be awarded the chair, couch and ottoman 
15 that the parties purchased through R.C. Willey, free and 
16 clear from any claim of interest by the plaintiff. 
17 Also, the plaintiff has agreed to pay an 
18 outstanding charge that has been incurred with one of the 
19 defendant's doctors. We believe that that sum is $262. That 
20 will be verified through counsel and evidently that charge 
21 was for a mouth guard. He has agreed to pay that within a 
22 reasonable time and I would suggest within thirty days of the 
23 receipt of that. 
24 There is also an issue of property being in the 
25 118th North property that we have agreed through the 














plaintiff. Some of his personal property and the camper is 
there and so forth. He is to have thirty days, a reasonable 
time, to remove any of his personal property from that 
residence. 
Now, if you will just give me one more minute, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Ms. Lems, would you repeat again for the 
Clerk's benefit the amount of alimony? 
MS. LEMS: The amount of alimony is $300 a month for 
ten years. 
THE COURT: Okay, fine. Proceed. 
MS. LEMS: We also need --in opportunity, we've 
13 I agreed by prior stipulation with this Court today that there 
14 were items of personal belonging that are in the marital home 
15 that the plaintiff is entitled to. Again, we would suggest 
16 that the parties be able to contact one another, either 
17 through a third party, whether itfs Mr. Oliver or I, or they 
18 contact one another on the phone and arrange a date and time 
19 mutual to them that the plaintiff can go with the police 
2 0 officers to remove that personal property. 
21 Now, evidently, there's at the last minute been 
22 brought up an issue of cabinets. And I apologize to the 
23 Court, but this is a new issue. Evidently there are cabinets 
24 that the plaintiff has made that are stored, about three 
25 pieces, in the 118th North property. There is also one piece 
26 of that said cabinet stored in the marital home where the 
30 
1 | plaintiff resides. The plaintiff was stating that she wants 
2 I that one cabinet and my client is stating that that is part 
3 of a set and he would like those cabinets. So, we are going 
4 to have to decide what we are doing with the cabinets. 
5 MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, we have done our best to 
6 resolve the personal property issue. We got to really --
7 when we went before the Court, we talked about the division 
8 of personal property. We talked about the division of really 
9 a camper and some furniture and we have resolved everything 
10 else. The basis for the resolution was that the plaintiff 
11 had enumerated the property that he felt that he was entitled 
12 to. We had negotiated that in good faith. And then the 
13 balance of the property remaining at the marital residence 
14 was to be my client1s. 
15 THE COURT: Well, that's what, one cabinet? He gets 
16 the other two. 
17 MS. LEMS: Well, they are a set evidently. He has 
18 the three cabinets and then the other piece of the cabinet --
19 MR. COLLINS: There are about six of them. I 
20 purchased them myself. One of them coincidentally is still 
21 in the garage over there. Now, why in the world is this 
22 becoming an issue? I would presume that they are just as 
23 much my personal property as the dishes, and that sort of 
24 thing. 
25 THE COURT: They are not installed in the house? 
26 They are just sitting --
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1 MS. LEMS: They are not installed. 
2 MR. OLIVER: Yes, Your Honor, and my client desires 
3 that they be mounted in the garage. 
4 MS. COLLINS: In my house. 
5 MR. OLIVER: In the house. 
6 THE COURT: Now there is one and how many is --
7 MS. COLLINS: They are upper cabinets for a kitchen. 
8 MR. OLIVER: My client just indicated it's a bank of 
9 upper cabinets for the kitchen. She would like them mounted 
10 in the house. She intends to do so. She had intended to use 
11 them as such. 
12 THE COURT: And what about the other two? 
13 MS. LEMS: Well, there is evidently, according to my 
14 client, six pieces to this cabinet. He has the five that are 
15 over at the 118th North property that he has stored there and 
16 then the other piece --
17 THE COURT: Well, he takes the five and she wants 
18 the one, well, then just -- am I understanding? You have the 
19 five in your possession now? 
2 0 MR. COLLINS: I purchased them. They are mine. As 
21 a matter of fact, one of the people was here as a witness. I 
22 bought brand new cabinets for him, anyway, I bought these 
23 cabinets from him. 
24 MS. COLLINS: After the separation? 
25 MR. COLLINS: No, prior to the separation. Two 













THE COURT: And she wants one of them and he wants 
the other five; correct? 
MR. OLIVER: We just want what is in our possession. 
I mean, we are not arguing over the cabinets. This came up 
after the resolution. This came up here in the courtroom 
right now, and this is the first time that they have been 
mentioned because we assumed --
THE COURT: Let me get this straight. Where are the 
cabinets located now? 
MS. LEMS: Five pieces of the cabinets are at 118th 
North? 
12 THE COURT: And that's in whose possession? 
13 MS. LEMS: That's going to be in her possession. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 MS. LEMS: But it has been used and he has his 
16 property stored there. 
17 THE COURT: Now, what are the cabinets worth? What 
18 did you pay for them? 
19 MR. COLLINS: Twelve hundred dollars. 
2 0 MR. OLIVER: And one set of the cabinets are located 
21 at my client's residence where she lives and that's the set 
22 that she wants. 
23 MR. COLLINS: She can have that one. Let her have 
24 it. 
25 MS. LEMS: Okay. I think we can agree that the 
26 I plaintiff can be awarded the one set of cabinets that she has 
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1 | in her possession at the marital residence and the remaining 
2 I cabinets that are located at 118th North will be awarded to 
3 the plaintiff. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. 
5 MS. LEMS: I think that does our stipulation, Your 
6 Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. 
8 MR. OLIVER: If I can just have one moment? There 
9 is a couple of clarifications, Your Honor, for me. First 
10 off, in regards to the child support, the order should read 
11 something to the effect that so long as --
12 THE COURT: As the government is paying for it, 
13 social security? 
14 MR. OLIVER: That's correct. Otherwise --
15 THE COURT: Well, I don't want to get in trouble. I 
16 was going to call that to your attention anyhow. 
17 MR. OLIVER: Yeah. She is entitled to readdress it 
18 in the event that that amount terminates. 
19 THE COURT: Sure. 
2 0 MR. OLIVER: And then also we would ask the 
21 plaintiff to use due diligence in locating a 30.06 that 
22 belongs to my client. If he has it in his possession, return 
23 it. 
24 THE COURT: If he has it, return it. If not --
25 MR. COLLINS: It's probably with my chain saws 
26 somewhere. 
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1 I MS. LEMS: We have no problem with that, Your Honor. 
2 I THE COURT: Okay. Is that it? 
3 1 MS. LEMS: That does it. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. Now, Mr. Collins, you have agreed 
5 to stipulation as read in the record. Do you concur in the 
6 stipulation? 
7 MR. COLLINS: Yes. 
8 THE COURT: Mrs. Collins, you have agreed to 
9 stipulation on the record. Do you concur in the stipulation? 
10 MS. COLLINS: Yes, sir. 
11 THE COURT: And now, itfs my understanding that the 
12 plaintiff is going to take the divorce? 
13 MR. OLIVER: Wefd like mutual, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Huh? 
15 MR. OLIVER: We'd like mutual. 
16 THE COURT: Mutual? Why? 
17 MS. LEMS: One more clarification, Your Honor. It's 
18 our understanding in checking with the court clerk on Monday 
19 that the defendant has not attended the divorce education 
2 0 class. We request that she attend that forthwith and 
21 hopefully within three days these parties can be divorced. 
22 THE COURT: I think I can waive that if you want? 
23 MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, my client has viewed the 
24 video on that. I am not sure certificate wise where that 
25 goes, but my client has viewed the video. She has 
26 participated in the course as is provided in the judgment. 
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1 THE COURT: But there is no hope. I don't think 
2 that a divorce education class is going to help any in this 
3 case, so --
4 MS. LEMS: It's for the children, not for them. 
5 THE COURT: I know it's for the children. 
6 MR. OLIVER: But she has viewed the video, so it's 
7 (inaudible). 
8 THE COURT: So for all practical purposes, she has 
9 complied, which I'll find to be the case. I hope no one 
10 takes me up on appeal on that issue, now. 
11 Okay. It's a mutual divorce. So, if each one of 
12 you want to come forward then, Mr. Collins, and you'll be 
13 sworn. 
14 MR. OLIVER: Do you want to swear them both at the 
15 same time, Your Honor? 
16 THE COURT: Yeah, both stand up. 
17 CLERK: Raise your right hands. 
18 (Parties sworn) 
19 THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Lems, do you want to take the 
2 0 stand here? 
21 ROBERT D. COLLINS 
22 Having been duly and legally sworn 
23 was examined and testified on his 
24 oath as follows: 
25 DIRECT EXAMINATION 







Q Mr. Collins, will you please state your name for 
the record? 
A Robert Collins. 
Q And you and the defendant were married on what 
date? 
A 25th of June 1983. 
7 I Q And have you resided in the County of Tooele three 
8 months prior to filing the divorce complaint in this action? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q And has that been your primary residence, in 
11 Tooele, Utah? 
12 A Yes. 
13 MS. LEMS: Anything else, Your Honor? 
14 THE COURT: Well, on the grounds. 
15 MS. LEMS: Oh, okay. 
16 EXAMINATION 
17 BY THE COURT 
18 Q You state irreconcilable differences. Can you tell 
19 the Court what some of the problems were that existed at the 
20 time you filed the complaint? You didn't get along? 
21 A Primarily, constant arguing. 
22 Q And it became impossible to continue the marriage 
23 relationship because of your arguing back and forth? 
24 A Yes. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. Now, you step down and Mrs. 
2 6 Collins, you can take the stand. 
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1 MR. OLIVER: May I examine her from here, Your 
2 Honor, or do you wish that she take the stand? 
3 THE COURT: Sure. No, that's fine. 
4 PATRICIA M. COLLINS 
5 j Having been duly and legally sworn 
6 I was examined and testified on her 
oath as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. OLIVER 
10 | Q State your name for the record, please. 
11 | A Patricia (inaudible). 
12 Q Were you married to Bob Collins, Robert Collins? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q And you heard the testimony of Robert Collins. 
15 Were you asked the same questions, would your response be the 
16 same? 
17 A Except why we split up. 
18 Q Okay. And so tell the Court why it is that you 
19 split up? 
2 0 A Because he was abusive and he assaulted me. 
21 THE COURT: And because of his conduct, it became 
22 impossible to continue the marriage relationship. The Court 
23 will grant a mutual divorce to the parties that is supposed 
24 to become final upon entry of the stipulation of complaint on 
25 file herein. Okay. The Court will be in recess, then, until 
26 Monday, I guess. 
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CLERK: Who is going to prepare the order? 
MS. LEMS: I'd be happy to. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. LEMS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. OLIVER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Proceedings concluded) 
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September 8, 1997 
Wendy J. Lems 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
D. Bruce Oliver 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218 
Dear Miss Lems - Mr. Oliver 
Pursuant to Respondent's objection to the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Decree, I have reviewed the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and in light of the objections, I 
have granted Respondent's objections only to those paragraphs 
which I have interlineated. 
I've enclosed a copy of the paragraphs which I have 
interlineated for each of you for your perusal. 
Miss Lems shall prepare the Findings of fact and Conclusions 
of Law in accordance with the interlineations. I trust you will 
make the necessary changes in the Conclusions of Law and Decree. 
Respectfully 
OOOfcdC 
JEROME H. MOONEY #2303 
WENDY J. LEMS, #7409 
MOONEY LAW FIRM, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)364-6500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
ROBERT D. COLLINS, : 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Petitioner, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
PATRICIA M. COLLINS, : 
Case No. 964300201 
Respondent. : Judge: Hon. John A. Rokich 
—oooOooo— 
This matter having been submitted to the Honorable John A. Rokich, of the above-
entitled Court, on the 11th day of June, 1997, upon stipulation of the parties, and in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. ,§30-3-4 (Supp., 1995), and Petitioner, Robert D. Collins, and Respondent, 
Patricia M. Collins, having entered into a Stipulated Agreement for Decree of Divorce and 
Property Settlement with the Court on June 11, 1997 before the Honorable John A. Rokich, 
whereon the parties consented to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, consented that pleadings 
should be withdrawn and the Court having heard testimony from the parties regarding the 
parties' residency, marriage date, grounds and their request that a mutual Decree of Divorce be 
entered pursuant to the terms of the parties Stipulation, and the Court having determined that 
more than ninety (90) days have elapsed since the filing of the Complaint in this matter, and the 
Court having determined that the parties have either completed the divorce counseling or have 
listened to the tape regarding the divorce counseling requirement, and the Court having reviewed 
the records and files herein and being fully advised of the premises, and the Court having made 
and entered herein its written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and upon stipulation of 
the parties and motion of Wendy J. Lems of Mooney Law Firm, P.C., attorneys for Petitioner; 
The Court does make, adopt and find the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner, Robert D. Collins, is a bona fide resident of Tooele County, State of Utah for 
more than three (3) months immediately prior to the filing of this divorce action. 
2. Respondent, Patricia M. Collins, is a bona fide resident of Tooele County, State of Utah 
for more that three (3) months immediately prior to the filing of this divorce action. 
3. Petitioner and Respondent are husband and wife, having been married on June 25, 1983 
in Tooele, Utah. 
4. Petitioner and Respondent separated on January 03, 1996. 
5. Petitioner and Respondent maintain their marital domicile in Tooele County, State of 
Utah. 
6. Irreconcilable differences have occurred between the parties making continuation of the 
marriage impossible. 
7. The Court finds and has entered the oral stipulation for Decree of Divorce and Property 
Settlement which was entered by the Court during the hearing held June 11, 1997, 
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concerning the division of the property of the parties, payment of support and debts, and 
other related matters which the Court now finds to be fair and equitable. 
There is one child as issue of this marriage, adopted by the parties during their marriage; 
to wit: Caitlin Collins born August 24, 1989. 
Utah is the home state of the child pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-3(l)(a). 
Neither Petitioner or Respondent have been a party, witness or participated in any other 
capacity in any other litigation concerning the custody of the child in the State of Utah or 
any other state, with the exception of the adoption of the minor child. 
Neither Petitioner or Respondent have any information of any custody proceedings 
concerning the child pending in a court of this or any other state. 
Petitioner and Respondent are fit and proper persons to be awarded joint legal custody of 
the minor child. The Respondent is a fit and proper person to be awarded the primary 
physical custody of the minor child and the minor child's primary residence should be 
with the Respondent. 
That the Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay zero (0) dollars in child support to the 
Respondent as long as the Respondent is receiving social security disability benefits on 
behalf of the minor child. In the event that the Respondent does not receive social 
security disability income benefits on behalf of the minor child, the matter of the 
obligation and payment of child support may be revisited with the Court. 
The Petitioner is awarded unsupervised visitation with the minor child pursuant to the 
Utah Minimum Schedule for Visitation §30-3-35, Utah Code Ann. (Supp., 1996). 
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ic^ap^^j^lc4<^^ visitation 
c^y until fuithci investigation by the appropriate 
15. The Petitioner will elect Wednesdays as his mid-week visitation day from 5:30 p.m. until 
8:30 p.m., unless the parties can mutually agree otherwise. 
16. The Petitioner is hereby ordered to abstain from the use of any alcohol 24Jho_ur& prior to 
visitation with the minor child or at any time during visitation with the minor child. In 
the event that the Respondent reasonably believes that the Petitioner has been drinking 
alcohol, titt&^ tt&tt^^ 
with the minor child will be suspende  
police authoritica'or pureuanMo the appropriate expedited hearing before the Court. 
17. The Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay the sum of $300 per month in alimony to the 
Respondent for a period often (10) years following the entry of the Decree of Divorce by 
the Court. Upon the expiration of the ten (10) year period, in the year 2007, alimony to 
the Respondent shall terminate and any further obligation to pay spousal support to the 
Respondent may be revisited by the Respondent through an appropriate motion to the 
Court. 
18. Alimony in this matter will terminate prior to the year 2007 in the event that Respondent 
remarries or cohabits with a member of the opposite sex. 
19. The Petitioner is hereby awarded the property located at 280 West Vine, Tooele, Utah. 
The Petitioner will assume any and all liability of the 280 West Vine property and will be 
entitled to any and all rents or proceeds from said property. The Respondent will be held 
harmless from any and all liability or debt on the 280 West Vine property and the 
Respondent will be entitled to an immediate judgment lien on said property in the amount 
of the principal amount due on the property's liability, in the event that Petitioner defaults 
in any way on the payment of the property's debt or other liability on said property. 
Respondent is entitled to foreclose her judgment lien on the property in the event of such 
default. 
20. The Respondent is hereby ordered to execute a Quit Claim Deed on the property located 
at 280 West Vine, Tooele, Utah in favor of the Petitioner within fifteen (15) days of the 
date of entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter, 
21. The Respondent is hereby awarded the marital home located at 32 North 200 West, 
Tooele, Utah. The Respondent will assume any and all liability on said property, holding 
the Petitioner harmless thereon. The Petitioner will be entitled to an immediate judgment 
lien on said property in the amount of the principal amount due on the property's liability, 
in the event that Respondent defaults in any way on the payment of the property's debt or 
other liability on said property. Petitioner is entitled to foreclose his judgment lien on the 
property in the event of such default. 
22. The Respondent is hereby awarded the rental properties located at 118 North 1st West, 
Tooele, Utah and 98 North 4th Street, Tooele, Utah, subject to any and all liability thereon 
and Respondent is entitled to any and all rents or proceeds from said property. The 
Petitioner will be entitled to an immediate judgment lien on said property(s) in the 
amount of the principal amount due on the property's liability, in the event that 
Respondent defaults in any way on the payment of the property's debt or other liability 
on said property(s). Petitioner is entitled to foreclose his judgment lien on the property(s) 
in the event of such default. 
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The Petitioner is hereby ordered to execute a Quit Claim Deed on the property located at 
32 North 200 West, Tooele, Utah; 118 North 1st West, Tooele, Utah; and 98 North 4th 
Street, Tooele, Utah. The Quit Claim Deed will be executed within a reasonable time and 
no later than fifteen (15) days from the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce in this 
matter. 
The personal property of the parties will be awarded as previously divided by the parties 
with the following exceptions: 
a. The Petitioner is hereby awarded his camper free from any claim of interest by the 
Respondent and subject to any and all liability thereon. 
b. The Respondent is hereby awarded the RC Wiley couch, chair and stool, free 
from any claim of interest by the Petitioner and subject to any and all liability 
thereon. 
c. The Petitioner is hereby awarded any and all property that he has stored at any of 
the rental units awarded to Respondent and is hereby ordered to remove said 
property within thirty (30) days of the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce in 
this matter. 
d. The Petitioner is hereby awarded any and all tools or other personal belongings 
that he has in the marital home's garage. Specifically, the Petitioner's two chain 
saws, miter box and any other tools belonging to Petitioner if said tools are still in 
Respondent's possession. 
e. The Respondent is hereby awarded her 30 aught 6 and Petitioner is hereby 
ordered to return the gun if the gun is still in Petitioner's possession. 
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f. The Respondent is awarded the one set cabinets that is remaining in the marital 
home. The remaining cabinets are in the possession of the Petitioner and are 
hereby awarded to Petitioner. 
g. Petitioner is hereby awarded his motorcycle free from any claim of interest by the 
Respondent and subject to any and all liability thereon. 
h. The Respondent is hereby ordered to provide the home videos of the minor child 
to the Petitioner to the Petitioner in a timely and reasonable manner for purposes 
of Petitioner making copies of the home videos or in the alternative, the 
Respondent can provide a copy of the home videos to the Petitioner in a 
reasonable and timely manner. 
i. The Petitioner is awarded all of his mother's furniture including the rocking chair, 
wash stand, china and silverware, couch and end tables. 
j . The Petitioner is awarded his grandfather's stop watch jf 4n the possession of the 
Respondent-. 
k. The Petitioner is awarded his father's coins. 
1. The Petitioner is awarded his godfather's dishes and pictures. UrY*^*/^*' ^^^^^ 
25. The Respondent is hereby awarded one-half (1/2) of any retirement sums that have 
accrued in Petitioner's retirement plan from the date of the parties marriage on June 26, 
1983, to the date of the parties separation on January 3, 1996. The proceeds of the 
retirement policy will be distributed pursuant to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
("QDRO") to be prepared by Respondent's counsel. 
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26. The Petitioner is further ordered to maintain health insurance for the minor child, 
provided it is reasonably available to him through his place of employment. The parties 
will equally divide the costs of any premiums incurred within thirty (30) days of the 
receipt thereon. 
27. The parties are each ordered to pay one-half of any non-insured medical expenses 
[including deductibles, copayments and medications] incurred on behalf of the minor 
child within thirty (30) days of the receipt thereon. 
28. The parties will each pay one-half (1/2) of any and all work related day care incurred on 
behalf of the minor child, within thirty (30) days of the receipt thereon. 
29. The parties are ordered to refrain and restrain from engaging in any acts of disparaging, 
harassing, intimidation or contacting one another with the exception that the parties may 
contact one another as it relates to the minor child. The parties are further restrained from 
discussing the divorce action in the presence of the minor child. 
30 The Petitioner is ordered to pay the marital debts and obligations of the parties, holding 
the Respondent harmless thereon, as follows: 
a. Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of the marital debts and 
obligations incurred by the parties during their period of marriage on June 25, 
1983 through the parties' separation on January 3, 1996y U-LcJL - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ x - ^ 
b. The Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay the dentist bill in the approximate amount 
of $262 for the Respondent's mouth guard upon proper verification of said bill by 
Respondent and within thirty (30) days upon receipt of said verification. 
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31. The Respondent is hereby ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of the martial debts and 
obligations of the parties incurred since the parties' marriage on June 25, 1983 through 
the parties' separation on January 3, 1996. uJfi^d^ ^>*^U^^ * i^vc^f^F^ 
32. Any debts incurred by the parties, individually, since the parties separation on January 3, 
1996, is awarded to them individually, free from any liability by the other party. 
33. The parties will cooperate in notifying creditors and pay their one-half of said marital 
debts and obligations in a timely and efficient manner. 
34. Respondent is awarded the tax exemption on the minor child as long as Respondent is 
receiving disability insurance on behalf of the minor child. In the event that Respondent 
no longer receives disability insurance on behalf of the minor child, and the issue of child 
support is readdressed by the Court, the issue of the award of the tax exemption can be 
revisited by the Court. 
35. Neither party is awarded attorneys fees in this matter and each of the parties will bear 
their own attorneys fees and costs in this matter. 
36. The parties are ordered to execute and deliver to the other party any documents necessary 
to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner, Robert D. Collins, and Respondent, Patricia M. Collins are mutually awarded 
a Decree of Divorce from one another on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, and 
the same should become final upon signing and entry of the Decree of Divorce in this 
matter. 
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2. Petitioner and Respondent are fit and proper persons to be awarded joint legal custody of 
the minor child. 
3. Respondent is a fit and proper person to be awarded primary physical custody of the 
minor child and the minor child's primary residence should be with the Respondent. 
4. The oral Stipulated Agreement for Decree of Divorce and Property Settlement was 
entered by the Court on June 11, 1997 and more fully recited in the foregoing Findings of 
Fact concerning the division of the property of the parties, payment of support, payment 
of the debts and obligations of the parties and any other matters as more specifically set 
forth above should be ratified, approved, and confirmed in all particulars, and the same 
should be embodied into the Decree of Divorce to be entered herein. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
That judgment be ordered accordingly. 
DATED this day of , 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on this^v£_ day of August, 1997,1 caused to be mailed, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the 
following: 
D. Bruce Oliver, Esq. 
Attorney for Respondent 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218 
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JEROME H. MOONEY #2303 
WENDY J. LEMS, #7409 
MOONEY LAW FIRM, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)364-6500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
ROBERT D.COLLINS, : 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Petitioner, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. : 
PATRICIA M. COLLINS, : 
: Case No. 964300201 
Respondent. : Judge: Hon. John A. Rokich 
—oooOooo— 
This matter having been submitted to the Honorable John A. Rokich, of the above-
entitled Court, on the 11th day of June, 1997, upon stipulation of the parties, and in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. ,§30-3-4 (Supp., 1995), and Petitioner, Robert D. Collins, and Respondent, 
Patricia M. Collins, having entered into a Stipulated Agreement for Decree of Divorce and 
Property Settlement with the Court on June 11, 1997 before the Honorable John A. Rokich, 
whereon the parties consented to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, consented that pleadings 
should be withdrawn and the Court having heard testimony from the parties regarding the 
parties' residency, marriage date, grounds and their request that a mutual Decree of Divorce be 
uOO^o 
entered pursuant to the terms of the parties Stipulation, and the Court having determined that 
more than ninety (90) days have elapsed since the filing of the Complaint in this matter, and the 
Court having determined that the parties have either completed the divorce counseling or have 
listened to the tape regarding the divorce counseling requirement, and the Court having reviewed 
the records and files herein and being fully advised of the premises, and the Court having made 
and entered herein its written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and upon stipulation of 
the parties and motion of Wendy J. Lems of Mooney Law Firm, P.C., attorneys for Petitioner; 
The Court does make, adopt and find the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner, Robert D. Collins, is a bona fide resident of Tooele County, State of Utah for 
more than three (3) months immediately prior to the filing of this divorce action. 
2. Respondent, Patricia M. Collins, is a bona fide resident of Tooele County, State of Utah 
for more that three (3) months immediately prior to the filing of this divorce action. 
3. Petitioner and Respondent are husband and wife, having been married on June 25, 1983 
in Tooele, Utah. 
4. Petitioner and Respondent separated on January 03,1996. 
5. Petitioner and Respondent maintain their marital domicile in Tooele County, State of 
Utah. 
6. Irreconcilable differences have occurred between the parties making continuation of the 
marriage impossible. 
7. The Court finds and has entered the oral stipulation for Decree of Divorce and Property 
Settlement which was entered by the Court during the hearing held June 11,1997, 
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concerning the division of the property of the parties, payment of support and debts, and 
other related matters which the Court now finds to be fair and equitable. 
8. There is one child as issue of this marriage, adopted by the parties during their marriage; 
to wit: Caitlin Collins born August 24,1989. 
9. Utah is the home state of the child pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-3(l)(a). 
10. Neither Petitioner or Respondent have been a party, witness or participated in any other 
capacity in any other litigation concerning the custody of the child in the State of Utah or 
any other state, with the exception of the adoption of the minor child. 
11. Neither Petitioner or Respondent have any information of any custody proceedings 
concerning the child pending in a court of this or any other state. 
12. Petitioner and Respondent are fit and proper persons to be awarded joint legal custody of 
the minor child. The Respondent is a fit and proper person to be awarded the primary 
physical custody of the minor child and the minor child's primary residence should be 
with the Respondent. 
13. That the Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay zero (0) dollars in child support to the 
Respondent as long as the Respondent is receiving social security disability benefits on 
behalf of the minor child. In the event that the Respondent does not receive social 
security disability income benefits on behalf of the minor child, the matter of the 
obligation and payment of child support may be revisited with the Court. 
14. The Petitioner is awarded unsupervised visitation with the minor child pursuant to the 
Utah Minimum Schedule for Visitation §30-3-35, Utah Code Ann. (Supp., 1996). 
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15. The Petitioner will elect Wednesdays as his mid-week visitation day from 5:30 p.m. until 
8:30 p.m., unless the parties can mutually agree otherwise. 
16. The Petitioner is hereby ordered to abstain from the use of any alcohol prior to visitation 
with the minor child or at any time during visitation with the minor child. In the event 
that the Respondent reasonably believes that the Petitioner has been drinking alcohol, 
visitation with the minor child will be suspended for that visitation period only. 
17. The Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay the sum of $300 per month in alimony to the 
Respondent for a period often (10) years following the entry of the Decree of Divorce by 
the Court. Upon the expiration of the ten (10) year period, in the year 2007, alimony to 
the Respondent shall terminate and any further obligation to pay spousal support to the 
Respondent may be revisited by the Respondent through an appropriate motion to the 
Court. 
18. Alimony in this matter will terminate prior to the year 2007 in the event that Respondent 
remarries or cohabits with a member of the opposite sex. 
19. The Petitioner is hereby awarded the property located at 280 West Vine, Tooele, Utah. 
The Petitioner will assume any and all liability of the 280 West Vine property and will be 
entitled to any and all rents or proceeds from said property. The Respondent will be held 
harmless from any and all liability or debt on the 280 West Vine property and the 
Respondent will be entitled to an immediate judgment lien on said property in the amount 
of the principal amount due on the property's liability, in the event that Petitioner defaults 
in any way on the payment of the property's debt or other liability on said property. 
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Respondent is entitled to foreclose her judgment lien on the property in the event of such 
default. 
20. The Respondent is hereby ordered to execute a Quit Claim Deed on the property located 
at 280 West Vine, Tooele, Utah in favor of the Petitioner within fifteen (15) days of the 
date of entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter. 
21. The Respondent is hereby awarded the marital home located at 32 North 200 West, 
Tooele, Utah. The Respondent will assume any and all liability on said property, holding 
the Petitioner harmless thereon. The Petitioner will be entitled to an immediate judgment 
lien on said property in the amount of the principal amount due on the property's liability, 
in the event that Respondent defaults in any way on the payment of the property's debt or 
other liability on said property. Petitioner is entitled to foreclose his judgment lien on the 
property in the event of such default. 
22. The Respondent is hereby awarded the rental properties located at 118 North 1st West, 
Tooele, Utah and 98 North 4th Street, Tooele, Utah, subject to any and all liability thereon 
and Respondent is entitled to any and all rents or proceeds from said property. The 
Petitioner will be entitled to an immediate judgment lien on said property(s) in the 
amount of the principal amount due on the property's liability, in the event that 
Respondent defaults in any way on the payment of the property's debt or other liability 
on said property(s). Petitioner is entitled to foreclose his judgment lien on the property(s) 
in the event of such default. 
23. The Petitioner is hereby ordered to execute a Quit Claim Deed on the property located at 
32 North 200 West, Tooele, Utah; 118 North 1st West, Tooele, Utah; and 98 North 4th 
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Street, Tooele, Utah. The Quit Claim Deed will be executed within a reasonable time and 
no later than fifteen (15) days from the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce in this 
matter. 
The personal property of the parties will be awarded as previously divided by the parties 
with the following exceptions: 
a. The Petitioner is hereby awarded his camper free from any claim of interest by the 
Respondent and subject to any and all liability thereon. 
b. The Respondent is hereby awarded the RC Wiley couch, chair and stool, free 
from any claim of interest by the Petitioner and subject to any and all liability 
thereon. 
c. The Petitioner is hereby awarded any and all property that he has stored at any of 
the rental units awarded to Respondent and is hereby ordered to remove said 
property within thirty (30) days of the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce in 
this matter. 
d. The Petitioner is hereby awarded any and all tools or other personal belongings 
that he has in the marital home's garage. Specifically, the Petitioner's two chain 
saws, miter box and any other tools belonging to Petitioner if said tools are still in 
Respondent's possession. 
e. The Respondent is hereby awarded her 30 aught 6 and Petitioner is hereby 
ordered to return the gun if the gun is still in Petitioner's possession. 
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f. The Respondent is awarded the one set cabinets that is remaining in the marital 
home. The remaining cabinets are in the possession of the Petitioner and are 
hereby awarded to Petitioner. 
g. Petitioner is hereby awarded his motorcycle free from any claim of interest by the 
Respondent and subject to any and all liability thereon. 
h. The Respondent is hereby ordered to provide the home videos of the minor child 
to the Petitioner to the Petitioner in a timely and reasonable manner for purposes 
of Petitioner making copies of the home videos or in the alternative, the 
Respondent can provide a copy of the home videos to the Petitioner in a 
reasonable and timely manner. 
i. The Petitioner is awarded all of his mother's furniture including the rocking chair, 
wash stand, china and silverware, couch and end tables. 
j . The Petitioner is awarded his grandfather's stop watch if in the possession of the 
Respondent. 
k. The Petitioner is awarded his father's coins. 
1. The Petitioner is awarded his godfather's dishes and pictures which are to be kept 
for the minor child, Caitlin. 
25. The Respondent is hereby awarded one-half (1/2) of any retirement sums that have 
accrued in Petitioner's retirement plan from the date of the parties marriage on June 26, 
1983, to the date of the parties separation on January 3,1996. The proceeds of the 
retirement policy will be distributed pursuant to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
(aQDROM) to be prepared by Respondent's counsel. 
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26. The Petitioner is further ordered to maintain health insurance for the minor child, 
provided it is reasonably available to him through his place of employment. The parties 
will equally divide the costs of any premiums incurred within thirty (30) days of the 
receipt thereon. 
27. The parties are each ordered to pay one-half of any non-insured medical expenses 
[including deductibles, copayments and medications] incurred on behalf of the minor 
child within thirty (30) days of the receipt thereon. 
28. The parties will each pay one-half (1/2) of any and all work related day care incurred on 
behalf of the minor child, within thirty (30) days of the receipt thereon. 
29. The parties are ordered to refrain and restrain from engaging in any acts of disparaging, 
harassing, intimidation or contacting one another with the exception that the parties may 
contact one another as it relates to the minor child. The parties are fiirther restrained from 
discussing the divorce action in the presence of the minor child. 
30. The Petitioner is ordered to pay the marital debts and obligations of the parties, holding 
the Respondent harmless thereon, as follows: 
a. Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of the marital debts and 
obligations incurred by the parties during their period of marriage on June 25, 
1983 through the parties' separation on January 3,1996, which includes the 
second mortgage on the property located 32 North 200 West, Tooele Utah. 
b. The Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay the dentist bill in the approximate amount 
of $262 for the Respondent's mouth guard upon proper verification of said bill by 
Respondent and within thirty (30) days upon receipt of said verification. 
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31. The Respondent is hereby ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of the martial debts and 
obligations of the parties incurred since the parties' marriage on June 25, 1983 through 
the parties' separation on January 3, 1996, which includes the second mortgage on the 
property located at 32 North 200 West, Tooele, Utah. 
32. Any debts incurred by the parties, individually, since the parties separation on January 3, 
1996, is awarded to them individually, free from any liability by the other party. 
33. The parties will cooperate in notifying creditors and pay their one-half of said marital 
debts and obligations in a timely and efficient manner. 
34. Respondent is awarded the tax exemption on the minor child as long as Respondent is 
receiving disability insurance on behalf of the minor child. In the event that Respondent 
no longer receives disability insurance on behalf of the minor child, and the issue of child 
support is readdressed by the Court, the issue of the award of the tax exemption can be 
revisited by the Court. 
35. The parties are ordered to execute and deliver to the other party any documents necessary 
to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
36. Each of the parties are ordered to bear their own attorney's fees and costs up to the time 
of entry of the Stipulation on June 11,1997. The Petitioner is awarded attorney's fees in 
the sum of $ ypP for defending against Respondent's Objection to 
Proposed Findings and Decree. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner, Robert D. Collins, and Respondent, Patricia M. Collins are mutually awarded 
a Decree of Divorce from one another on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, and 
9 
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the same should become final upon signing and entry of the Decree of Divorce in this 
matter. 
Petitioner and Respondent are fit and proper persons to be awarded joint legal custody of 
the minor child. 
Respondent is a fit and proper person to be awarded primary physical custody of the 
minor child and the minor child's primary residence should be with the Respondent. 
Pursuant to the Court's letter of September 8, 1997, in regards to Respondent's objection 
to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce, the 
Court hereby orders that each of the parties is ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of the marital 
debts and obligations of the parties incurred since the parties' marriage on June 25, 1983 
through the parties' separation on January 3,1996 which includes the second mortgage 
on the property located at 32 North 200 West, Tooele, Utah. 
The oral Stipulated Agreement for Decree of Divorce and Property Settlement was 
entered by the Court on June 11, 1997 and more fully recited in the foregoing Findings of 
Fact concerning the division of the property of the parties, payment of support, payment 
of the debts and obligations of the parties and any other matters as more specifically set 
forth above should be ratified, approved, and confirmed in all particulars, and the same 
should be embodied into the Decree of Divorce to be entered herein. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
That judgment be ordered accordingly. 
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DATED this Jf9 day of V cjhol)*/ , 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
JOjMORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH 
District Court Judge 
NOTICE PURSUANT TO RULE 4-504 OF THE RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TO THE RESPONDENT AND HIS COUNSEL, D. BRUCE OLIVER: 
Notice is hereby given that pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration 
of the District and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, that this Order prepared by the Petitioner shall 
be the Order of the Court unless you file an objection in writing within five (5) days from the date 
of the service of this notice. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on this £1 day of October, 1997,1 caused to be mailed, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the 
following: 
D. Bruce Oliver, Esq. 
Attorney for Respondent 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218 
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JEROME H. MOONEY #2303 
WENDY J. LEMS, #7409 
MOONEY LAW FIRM, P.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-6500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
ROBERT D. COLLINS, : 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Petitioner, : 
vs. : 
PATRICIA M. COLLINS, : 
: Case No. 964300201 
Respondent. : Judge: Hon. John A. Rokich 
—oooOooo— 
This matter having been submitted to the Honorable John A. Rokich, of the above-
entitled Court, on the 11th day of June, 1997, upon stipulation of the parties, and in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann.,§30-3-4 (Supp., 1995), and Petitioner, Robert D. Collins, and Respondent, 
Patricia M. Collins, having entered into a Stipulated Agreement for Decree of Divorce and 
Property Settlement with the Court on June 11, 1997 before the Honorable John A. Rokich, 
whereon the parties consented to the Entry of the Decree of Divorce, consented that pleadings 
should be withdrawn and the Court having heard testimony from the parties regarding the 
parties' residency, marriage date, grounds and their request that a mutual Decree of Divorce be 
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entered pursuant to the terms of the parties' Stipulation, and the Court having determined that 
more than ninety (90) days have elapsed since the filing of the Complaint in this matter, and the 
Court having determined that the parties have either completed the divorce counseling or have 
listened to the tape regarding the divorce counseling requirement, and the Court having reviewed 
the records and files herein and being fully advised of the premises, and the Court having made 
and entered herein its written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and upon stipulation of 
the parties and motion of Wendy J. Lems of Mooney Law Firm, P.C., attorneys for Petitioner; 
NOW, THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. The Petitioner, Robert D. Collins, and the Respondent, Patricia M. Collins, are hereby 
awarded a Decree of Divorce from one another upon the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences, and the marriage between Petitioner and Respondent be and the same is 
hereby dissolved, and the parties are hereby freed and absolutely released from the bonds 
of matrimony and all the obligations thereof for said Decree to become final upon signing 
and entry of this Decree of Divorce. 
2. Petitioner and Respondent are hereby awarded joint legal custody of the minor child, to 
wit: Caitlin Collins, born August 24, 1989, with primary physical custody of the child 
awarded to the Respondent. 
3. That the Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay zero (0) dollars in child support to the 
Respondent as long as the Respondent is receiving social security disability benefits on 
behalf of the minor child. In the event that the Respondent does not receive social 
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security disability income benefits on behalf of the minor child, the matter of the 
obligation and payment of child support may be revisited with the Court. 
The Petitioner is awarded unsupervised visitation with the minor child pursuant to the 
Utah Standard Visitation Guidelines §30-3-35, Utah Code Ann. (Supp., 1996). 
The Petitioner will elect Wednesdays as his mid-week visitation day from 5:30 p.m. until 
8:30 p.m., pursuant to the Guidelines, unless the parties can mutually agree otherwise. 
The Petitioner is hereby ordered to abstain from the use of any alcohol prior to visitation 
with the minor child or at any time during visitation with the minor child. In the event 
that the Respondent reasonably believes that the Petitioner has been drinking alcohol, 
visitation with the minor child will be suspended for that visitation period only. 
The Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay the sum of $300 per month in alimony to the 
Respondent for a period often (10) years following the entry of the Decree of Divorce by 
the Court. Upon the expiration of the ten (10) year period, in the year 2007, the matter of 
the payment of alimony will terminate and may be revisited by the Respondent through 
an appropriate motion to the Court. 
Alimony in this matter will terminate prior to the year 2007 in the event that Respondent 
remarries or cohabits with a member of the opposite sex. 
The Petitioner is hereby awarded the property located at 280 West Vine, Tooele, Utah. 
The Petitioner will assume any and all liability of the 280 West Vine property and will be 
entitled to any and all rents or proceeds from said property, and will hold the Respondent 
harmless thereon. The Respondent is entitled to an immediate judgment lien on said 
property for the principal amount due in the event that Petitioner defaults on any of the 
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debt or liability of said property. In the event of such default, Respondent is entitled to 
foreclose her lien on the property. 
10. The Respondent is hereby ordered to execute a Quit Claim Deed on the property located 
at 280 West Vine, Tooele, Utah in favor of Petitioner within a reasonable time and no 
later than fifteen (15) days from the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter. 
11. The Respondent is hereby awarded the marital home located at 32 North 200 West, 
Tooele, Utah. The Respondent will assume any and all liability on said property, holding 
the Petitioner harmless thereon. The Petitioner is entitled to an immediate judgment lien 
on said property for the principal amount due in the event that Respondent defaults on 
any of the debt or liability of said property. In the event of such default, Petitioner is 
entitled to foreclose his lien on the property. 
12. The Respondent is hereby awarded the rental properties located at 118 North 1st West, 
Tooele, Utah and 98 North 4th Street, Tooele, Utah, and will be entitled to any and all 
rents or proceeds from said property. The Respondent will assume any and all liability 
on said property, holding the Petitioner harmless thereon. The Petitioner is entitled to an 
immediate judgment lien on said property for the principal amount due in the event that 
Respondent defaults on any of the debt or liability of said property(s). In the event of 
such default, Petitioner is entitled to foreclose his lien on the property(s). 
13. The Petitioner is hereby ordered to execute a Quit Claim Deed on the property located at 
32 North 200 West, Tooele, Utah; 118 North 1st West, Tooele, Utah; and 98 North 4th 
Street, Tooele, Utah. The Quit Claim Deed will be executed within a reasonable time and 
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no later than fifteen (15) days from the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce in this 
matter. 
The personal property of the parties will be awarded as previously divided by the parties 
with the following exceptions: 
a. The Petitioner is hereby awarded his camper free from any claim of interest by the 
Respondent and subject to any and all liability thereon. 
b. The Respondent is hereby awarded the RC Wiley couch, chair and stool, free 
from any claim of interest by the Petitioner and subject to any and all liability 
thereon. 
c. The Petitioner is hereby awarded any and all property that he has stored at any of 
the rental units and is hereby ordered to remove said property within thirty (30) 
days of the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter. 
d. The Petitioner is hereby awarded any and all tools or other personal belongings 
that he has at the marital home or in the marital home's garage. Specifically, the 
Petitioner's two chain saws and miter box and any other tools belonging to 
Petitioner. 
e. The Respondent is hereby awarded her 30 aught 6 and Petitioner is hereby 
ordered to return the gun if the gun is still in Petitioner's possession. 
f. The Respondent is awarded one set of cabinets that is remaining in the marital 
home. The remaining cabinets are in the possession of the Petitioner and are 
hereby awarded to Petitioner. 
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g. The Petitioner is hereby awarded his motorcycle free from any claim of interest 
by the Respondent and subject to any and all liability thereon. 
h. The Respondent is hereby ordered to provide the home videos of the minor child 
to the Petitioner in a timely and reasonable manner for purposes of Petitioner 
making copies of the home videos or in the alternative, the Respondent can 
provide a copy of the home videos to the Petitioner in a reasonable and timely 
manner. 
i. The Petitioner is awarded all of his mother's furniture including but not limited to 
the rocking chair, washstand, china and silverware, couch and end tables. 
j . The Petitioner is awarded his grandfather's stop watch if in the possession of the 
Respondent. 
k. The Petitioner is awarded his father's coins. 
1. The Petitioner is awarded his godfather's dishes and pictures which are to be kept 
for the minor child, Caitlin. 
The Respondent is hereby awarded one-half (1/2) of any retirement sums that have 
accrued in Petitioner's retirement plan from the date of the parties' marriage on June 26, 
1983, to the date of the parties' separation on January 3, 1996. The proceeds of the 
retirement policy will be distributed pursuant to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
("QDRO") to be prepared by Respondent's counsel. 
The Petitioner is further ordered to maintain health insurance for the minor child, 
provided it is reasonably available to him through his place of employment. The parties 
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will equally divide the costs of any premiums incurred within thirty (30) days of the 
receipt thereon. 
17. The parties are each ordered to pay one-half of any non-insured medical expenses 
[including deductibles, copayments and medications] incurred on behalf of the minor 
child within thirty (30) days of the receipt thereon. 
18. The parties will each pay one-half (1/2) of any and all work related day care incurred on 
behalf of the minor child, within thirty (30) days of the receipt thereon. 
19. The parties are ordered to refrain and restrain from engaging in any acts of disparaging, 
harassing, intimidation or contacting one another with the exception that the parties may 
contact one another as it relates to the minor child. The parties are further restrained from 
discussing the divorce action in the presence of the minor child. 
20. The Petitioner is ordered to pay the marital debts and obligations of the parties, holding 
the Respondent harmless thereon, as follows: 
a. Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of the remaining marital debts 
and obligations incurred by the parties during their period of marriage on June 25, 
1983 through the parties' separation on January 3, 1996, which includes the 
second mortgage on the property located at 32 North 200 West, Tooele, Utah. 
b. The Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay the Respondent's dentist bill in the 
approximate amount of $262 for the Respondent's mouth guard, within thirty (30) 
days of receipt thereof upon proper verification of said bill by Respondent. 
21. The Respondent is hereby ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of the remaining martial debts 
and obligations of the parties incurred since the parties' marriage on June 25, 1983 
7 
through the parties' separation on January 3, 1996, which includes the second mortgage 
on the property located at 32 North 200 West, Tooele, Utah. 
22. Any debts incurred by the parties, individually, since the parties separation on January 3, 
1996, is awarded to them individually, free from any liability by the other party. 
23. The parties will cooperate in notifying creditors and pay their one-half of said marital 
debts and obligations in a timely and efficient manner. 
24. Respondent is awarded the tax exemption on the minor child as long as Respondent is 
receiving disability insurance on behalf of the minor child. In the event that Respondent 
no longer receives disability insurance on behalf of the minor child, and the issue of child 
support is readdressed by the Court, the issue of the award of the tax exemption can be 
revisited by the Court. 
25. The parties are ordered to execute and deliver to the other party any documents necessary 
to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
26. Each of the parties are ordered to bear their own attorney's fees and costs up to the time 
of entry of the Stipulation on June 11, 1997. The Petitioner is awarded attorney's fees in 
the sum of $ y^Oc) - for defending against Respondent's Objection to 
Proposed Findings and Decree. 
DATED this off day of 0 ^ 0 k*S^ , 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH 
Third District Court Judge 
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NOTICE PURSUANT TO RULE 4-504 OF THE RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TO THE RESPONDENT AND HIS COUNSEL, D. BRUCE OLIVER: 
Notice is hereby given that pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration 
of the District and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, that this Order prepared by the Petitioner shall 
be the Order of the Court unless you file an objection in writing within five (5) days from the date 
of the service of this notice. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on this <??? day of October, 1997,1 caused to be mailed, postage pre-
paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE to the following: 
D. Bruce Oliver, Esq. 
Attorney for Respondent 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218 
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